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Applied Linguistics

On the Origins of Linguistic Structure:
Three Models of Regular and Irregular Past Tense Formation
Committee Chair: Irene Appelbaum^A^
Bates and Goodman (1999) represent a “unified lexicalist” approach to grammar, arguing that both
grammar and the lexicon are subserved by the same domain-general learning mechanism, and further,
that grammar “emerges” from the lexicon. Plunkett and Marchman’s work on past tense formation
(1991, 1993), improving upon the modeling techniques of Rumelhart and McClelland (1986),
exemplifies a unified lexicalist approach. By abandoning the more traditional dual-mechanism
approach (Chomsky & Halle, 1968; Chomsky, 1968, 1986, 1988; Pinker, 1994, 1999; Pinker &
Prince 1988, 1994), unified lexicalists aim to provide a more plausible account of child language
acquisition beyond the rote-leaming phase. Pinker (1999), in the spirit of the Pinker & Prince (1988,
1994), repudiates the unified lexicalist approach, however, on grounds that single mechanisms model
the acquisition of regular and irregular morphology inaccurately. Results of psychological studies
such as the “wug” test (Gleason, 1958; Pinker, 1999) suggest that the transition to the systembuilding phase (Stage 2 in the u-shaped learning process) is largely underdetermined in the unified
account. It is argued that unified lexicalists fail to (i) offer a coherent definition of “emergence” and
(ii) adequately clarify how, or by what mechanism(s), grammar can properly be said to emerge from
the lexicon. On the other hand, it is argued that Pinker fails to (i) provide a clear account of that
which is “instinctual” about the dual mechanism when it comes to regular and irregular morphology,
(ii) address the improvements made by conncctionists on the single mechanism model, and (iii)
explain how his higher-level psychological theory can be implemented at the lower neurological level
(without appeal to a connectionist “abstract neurology”). In a more comprehensive approach to the
emergence of regular and irregular past tense, one that operates on different levels of analysis
(psychological versus neurological), both single- and dual-mechanism accounts hold indispensable
pieces of the explanatory puzzle.
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1.0 The Issue:
A Martian scientist, landing on earth to perform a taxonomy o f its species, would
rightly conclude that there is something unique to the system of communication used by
humans. The grammatical structure of human language renders it distinct from all other
instances o f animal communication. Only human language reveals such combinatorial,
exponential, and recursive (Pinker, 1999: 1-19) power, or “generativity.” What causally
determines the grammatical structure of human language is one o f the most fundamental
questions concerning linguistics of the 21st century.
Linguistics of the late 1950s, fueled by the revolutionary work of Noam Chomsky,
was compelled to the view that a grammar module, operating according to innate
grammatical principles, accounts for the structure of human language. On Chomsky’s
view, the structure of language is essentially hard-wired, or built into the brain. Our
biogenetic endowment ensures a domain-specific mechanism, a “mental organ,” which is
dedicated to the acquisition of grammatical rules. The grammar module is a highly
systematic—indeed, productive—cogvüXxvQ mechanism. The lexicon, by contrast, is
considered to be the repository of the arbitrary (e.g. Chomsky & Halle, 1968).
In the mid-1980s, an alternative to the classical nativist/empiricist dichotomy began
to take shape, what is referred to as “emergentism.” On the emergentist view, the
structure of language is largely self-organized (from both evolutionary and developmental
standpoints), resulting from conservative genetic interaction with a structured world.
Humans are biogenetically endowed with non-linguistic, general cognitive mechanisms,
and the rate at which these mechanisms develop actually acts as a constraint on language

1
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acquisition and systemization. Linguistic structure is thus a by-product o f maturational
constraints on the development o f non-linguistic cognitive mechanisms, and lexical
processes accomplished by a general cognitive mechanism which detects regularities in the
input. Rules of grammar are generalized over these regularities, emerging as distributed,
“virtual” representations, not as explicit unconscious representations (as it is often put)
inherent in the brain’s architecture.
Allegiance to Chomsky’s approach is nevertheless still pervasive. It seems the
dominant paradigm in linguistics today, although gradually shifting, retains some
fundamental nativist assumptions (e.g. innate knowledge of language, domain-specificity,
genetic determinism). Pinker (1999), for instance, holds that the structure o f language is
primarily generated by grammar, or by a “rule” module; further, this module operates
according to (putatively) innate principles. Although Pinker dissents from Chomsky and
Halle’s treatment of the irregulars (see “Rules All the Way Down” section), he concurs
with them on one fundamental point: linguistic structure is most significantly determined
by a language-specific cognitive organ, the microcircuitry of which has been “hard-wired,”
or prespecified in the genome (though not necessarily directly prespecified, see “Unified
Lexicalist,” “Convergent Model, ” and “Discussion” sections). Our biogenetic endowment
ensures a complete modular separation between lexical and grammatical processes (i.e.
between “words”and “rules”). The question concerning nativists and emergentists alike is
whether the structure o f language is determined by a domain-5/?ec//;c module, dedicated to
the acquisition of grammatical rules, or by ûomdim-gemral cognitive mechanisms.
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1.1 The Models:
Chomsky and Halle (1968) treat irregular and regular morphology as a highly
lawful, rule-bound enterprise, in which most regular and irregular changes boil down to a
small handful of “austere” grammatical rules. For example, the past tense changes of
nearly 165 irregular verbs are handled by only three phonological rules (Chomsky and
Halle, 1968; also Pinker 1999: 92-4). Chomsky and Halle thus present a “rules all the way
down” dual-mechanism model. One mechanism, a robust grammar module including at
least one sub-module for phonological processes, generates infinite structure according to
explicit unconscious rules, while the other mechanism, the lexicon, is finite, variable, and
more or less discontinuous. (See figure 1.)
Pinker (1999), though, departs from Chomsky and Halle’s view that irregular
verbs are handled by explicit unconscious rules. Pinker presents an alternative model of
irregular past tense formation, in which irregulars are mediated by a parallel distributed
processor, or a pattern associator memory. The pattern associator produces rule-Me
behavior (stem-stem and change-change structures), but only according to local processes
of association, not according to explicit unconscious rules. Pinker thus presents a dual
mechanism model, in which irregulars are handled by a pattern associator and regulars by
a “rule” module (a symbol processor). Pinker posits an innately constrained, hard-wired
“blocking mechanism” to account for much of the success children have with past tense
formation toward the end of system-building phase and throughout the fine-tuning phase
(Stage 3 in the U-shaped learning pattern). (See figure 2.)
Bates and Goodman (1999), Plunkett and Marchman (1993), and Rumelhart and
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McClelland (1986) all contribute evidence for language’s emergence. Elements from the
work o f each of these scholars represents a third approach to modeling regular and
irregular past tense formation—the emergent approach. Bates and Goodman (1999), for
instance, argue that grammar “emerges” from the developmental and mechanical processes
of a single, general cognitive device (modeled by Rumelhart and McClelland and Plunkett
and Marchman for past tense formation). Bates, Goodman, Rumelhart, McClelland,
Plunkett, and Marchman all entertain some version of the single mechanism model, in
which linguistic structure is an emergent by-product of maturational constraints and the
inherent processes of associative memory (i .e. pattern association). Emergentism is
informed by state-of-the-art research being done in human genetic mapping (the Human
Genome Project), evolutionary biology, developmental psychology, and computer science.
(See figure 3.)

2.0 Unified Lexicalism;
From their title, “On the Emergence of Grammar from the Lexicon,” Bates and
Goodman (1999) make it clear that their theory of how children come to perform complex
grammatical operations departs from traditional empiricist (Aristotle—>Locke—>Skinner)
and nativist (Plato—>Descartes->Chomsky) views. Bates and Goodman attempt to place
the nature-nurture debate on a novel playing field, preserving elements of both extremist
views, and departing from other problematic claims. But how exactly should we
characterize this departure? On the empiricist view, children learn how to use language
with general learning mechanisms and the help of explicit training (also “on analogy,” via
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“generalization,” or even by way of “operant conditioning” in behaviorist terms), rather
than knowledge o f language somehow being encoded in the genome. Empiricists, then,
believe that grammar is learned bottom-up, through inductive learning accomplished by
mechanisms similar to (if not the same as) ones we use to learn how to tie our shoes,
mentally rotate images, succeed at Magic Eye, direct our attention, store information, and
generalize over past experience. Nativists, by contrast, emphasize top-down acquisition of
knowledge of language; that is, to a considerable extent KOL is thought to be present at
birth, children having been biogenetically endowed (e.g. by natural selection or physical
law) with a domdm-specific (i.e. for grammar proper) mechanism (or “mental organ”) that
operates according to built-in principles (Chomsky, 1986, 1995).
Bates and Goodman’s notion of emergentism, specifically with regard to the
emergence o f grammar from the lexicon, departs from traditional empiricism because it
entails some version of the biological endowment argument (e.g. chronotopic innateness;
see Elman, 1999), albeit a toned-down version. Emergentists admit that our biological
endowment of wow-linguistic mechanisms used in language computations constrains
language acquisition. “Learning plays a central role but does so within biological
constraints” (Bates & Goodman, 1999: 31). It is not the case that we bring a “blank slate”
to the task of language acquisition; rather, acquisition occurs in a complex synergy
between biogenetic constraints (on the development of domain-general mechanisms) and
environmental constraints like the structure of the input. Grammatical abilities are thought
to be spawned indirectly from genetic specification. Bates and Goodman depart from the
nativist tradition, however, arguing that grammar is mediated by domain-^ewera/ learning
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mechanisms; in fact, grammar emerges out of the lexicon, which itself is a product of
general cognition. With these departures from both empiricism and nativism, emergentism
denotes a “genuine third alternative” (31). Bates and Goodman leave the “toning-down of
the innateness claim” project to other researchers (Elman, 1996, 1999), and primarily take
issue with the nativist claim of domain-specificity.
My view is that domain-specificity is an untenable claim at the implementational
(neural) level. In light of current findings in genetics and neuroscience, it is implausible
that our biogenetic endowment would specify precisely that class of stimuli which neural
“language” mechanisms can serve. Even if humans are limited to the use of domaingeneral cognitive mechanisms throughout early ontogenesis (1-4 years o f age), it is not
necessary to view general cognition as an unconstrained monolith—entirely open-ended—
with no sub-mechanisms or sub-layers*. The proposal is that we can have a “modular”
theory (in the strict sense o f multi-layered processing), yet simultaneously retain the claim
to domain-generality (and thus, emergence). The single/dual mechanism characterization
o f past tense models does not map directly onto the domain-generality/domain-specificity
distinction. Modularity effects detected as early as age 3 (e.g. in past tense formation, see
Kim et al., 1994) might, in fact, be signs that two different general cognitive sub-layers, or
mechanisms, are beginning to dissociate, each subserving a more specialized general
cognitive function (e.g. rapid versus attended categorization o f stimuli). By no means,
though, do we have to rely upon direct genetic constraints to ensure these effects. Even
Bates and Goodman admit that modularization is a normal aspect of ontogenesis (1999:

*Newport et. al (1999), for example, find evidence for an innate statistical learning mechanism, but this is a
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64). Nevertheless, modularity effects are the outcome of development, not its cause.
Bates and Goodman propose a “unified lexicalist” (37) approach to grammar in the
spirit o f Goldberg (1999). The unified lexicalist approach to grammar’s emergence stands
in direct opposition to nativist approaches that posit domain-specificity.
Most nativists concede that the lexicon is finite, varies markedly over languages,
and must be learned (at least in part) through brute-force [bottom-up] inductive
procedures that are also used for other forms of learning, linguistic and nonlinguistic... [But] Because core grammar is universal, functionally opaque, and
infinitively generative, the domain-general procedures that are used to acquire
words cannot (it is argued) work for the acquisition and processing of grammar.
(Bates and Goodman, 37)
If grammar cannot be learned bottom-up, then grammatical and lexical development must
unfold on independent developmental pathways (Chomsky, 1986; Pinker, 1994, 1999;
Ouhalla, 1999). Both nativists and Bates and Goodman would agree that lexical learning
utilizes general cognitive mechanisms. The heart o f the debate is whether grammar
(putatively domain-specific) shares an interface with the lexicon (i.e. in the sense o f two
separate modules sharing information via a mediating mechanism), or, on the other hand,
whether it emerges from the lexicon (i.e. is subserved by the same domain-general
mechanism as the lexicon). If grammar and the lexicon turn out to be separate modules,
we have no grounds for claiming that grammar “emerges” from general learning
mechanisms. Contrarily, if general learning mechanisms are all children bring to the task
o f language acquisition, we must re-evaluate the fundamentals of generative linguistics in
general. We could no longer hold the view that grammar is determined by “knowledge of

component o f general cognition.
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language” (Chomsky, 1986), present in our brains, instead, grammar would be determined
by “knowledge of linguists,” and their descriptive vocabulary.
In certain atypical populations (e.g. brain damaged patients with localized lesions),
nativists look for a double dissociation between grammatical and lexical proficiency as
evidence that domain-specific structures in the brain subserve these two different types of
operations, or in any case, that the same mechanism does not subserve both. For example,
if grammatical proficiency after brain trauma remains stable while lexical proficiency or
general learning plummets, this is an indication that grammar and the lexicon are mediated
by separate mechanisms. If, in a different population, grammatical proficiency after brain
trauma plummets while general learning remains intact, this is even further evidence that
we have two separate mechanisms at work. Thus, nativists would clearly not agree with
Bates and Goodman that the lexicon and grammar are “unified” in a strong sense^. Bates
and Goodman provide evidence that the lexicon and grammar are inextricably tied
throughout childhood (1-3 years old) in normal populations, citing a strong correlation
between grammatical scores on parental reports/proficiency tests and lexical tallies, so
strong that an assessment of lexical proficiency is the best available predictor o f later
grammatical proficiency. Never do grammatical skills outstrip lexical skills, even into the
“very heart of grammatical development” (46), between age 3 and 3 .5, when normally
developing children can produce most of the elementary syntactic structures o f their
language (passives, relative clauses, etc.). In abnormal populations (late/early talkers.

^Current generative linguistics (e.g. Chomsky’s iniiiimalist program, 1995) focuses on how Universal
Grammar (UG) accesses the lexicon, so clearly there is thought to be some exchange of information at an
interface, but this exchange only occurs at the interface (otherwise the mechanisms are autonomous).

8
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children with brain lesions, Williams syndrome. Down syndrome. Specific Language
Impairment), apparent dissociations, or even double dissociations, are either non-existent
within the 1-3 age bracket, or result from woM-linguistic deficits.
The only two cases of clear dissociation, that o f DNS and SLI, can be traced to
acoustic deficits, which themselves (coupled with other non-linguistic impairments)
account for differences in vocabulary size and grammatical complexity. DNS individuals,
for example, exhibit significant impairment o f auditory short-term memory compared to
WMS individuals, though they score significantly better than WMS patients on visual
short-term memory tasks (Wang & Bellugi, 1994). The DNS sample’s auditory deficit, in
conjunction with other general cognitive deficits (low IQ, 40-60), account for the fact that
DNS vocabulary and grammar skills dissociate, while WMS scores reveal no such
dissociation.
Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising the DNS individuals are
selectively impaired in the ability to detect, store, and retrieve those aspects of
their linguistic input that are lowest in phonological salience (as Leonard,
Bortolini, Caselli, McGregor, & Sabbadini, 1992, reported for children with SLI)
and lowest in visual imagery (as Goodglass & Menn, 1985, reported for adults
with Broca’s aphasia). (Bates & Goodman, 1999: 62)
To date, no population—normal or abnormal—exhibits a dissociation of grammatical and
lexical proficiency that can be traced to impairment of a domain-specific grammar module,
as Pinker (1991) suggests for DNS individuals.
Bates and Goodman are careful to draw a distinction between domain-specificity
and localization (65). A certain function can be “localized” (i.e. mediated routinely by the
same region in the brain) and simultaneously attend to other classes of stimuli (e.g. non-
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linguistic stimuli). Bates and Goodman concede that localization effects might lead to
modularity later in life, but not during the formative years of child language acquisition
(64). The flaw in Bates and Goodman’s argument is that from a correlation between test
scores in their data (MLU, GDI, etc.), they infer that “the acquisition and neural
representation of grammar and the lexicon are accomplished by domain-general
mechanisms” (39). Few nativists, neither Pinker nor Chomsky, for example, nor
emergentists demanding an account of the mechanisms whereby grammar “emerges,”
would accept this leap from correlation to causation.
Bates and Goodman’s evidence (a strong lexicon/grammar correlation across
normal populations and a lack of dissociation in atypical populations) can actually be
accommodated by the nativist approach. As Bates and Goodman themselves recognize,
“correlation is not [common] cause” (43). Even if we grant that lexical and grammatical
proficiency are reliable predictors o f each other cross-linguistically, we can only say that a
dissociation “seem[s] to require” a “separate neural system for grammar” (67), and
conversely, that a strong correlation is evidence only that the lexicon and grammar seem to
be mediated by the same domain-general mechanism. The same evidence could be seen in
an entirely different light. From the nativist’s perspective, all the evidence shows is that
the development of two independent proficiencies (lexical and grammatical) is highly
correlated. This would make perfect sense for the nativist because the lexicon and
grammar are thought to share an interface with one another which propels language
acquisition into and beyond the first word combination stage (18-20 months). Syntax
must have some way of accessing semantics, especially after 18-20 months. Bates and

10
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Goodman’s faulty assumption is that nativist accounts necessarily presuppose a "hard”
dissociation. Bates and Goodman might be mistaking the operation of a syntax-semantics
interface, which would reveal a strong lexicon/grammar correlation, as the operation o f
syntax proper. Even a generative nativist (not that these two characterizations are
necessarily coextensive) would recognize a lawful correlation between grammar and the
lexicon at the syntax-semantics interface (e.g. Chomsky, 1968, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1995).
Bates and Goodman claim that grammar “emerges” from the lexicon, but without
violating their own principle, they cannot provide an adequate account as to what this
means, or how (by what mechanism) emergence occurs, so their use of the term rings with
“spookiness,” or at least underdeveloped hypotheses. As such, emergence in Bates and
Goodman’s sense is only a thumb nail sketch of a “genuine third alternative.” Bates and
Goodman provide a number o f examples of emergent outcomes, representing the specific
senses o f non-predictability, self-organization, and so on, but they never explain what the
“emergence o f grammar from the lexicon” means, aside from the reticent suggestion that
lexical and grammatical processing “seem to be” mediated by the same domain-general
learning mechanism. This problem of vagueness is not only terminological, indicative of
an inadequate or incoherent definition of “emergence”; even worse, it is substantive,
indicative of an inadeqaute account of the mechanisms whereby grammar emerges. Part
o f my project, then, is to formulate a definition of grammar’s emergence in terms of non
predictability, self-organization, and non-additivity, thereby rendering the implicit
connections in the analogies (honeycomb, giraffe’s neck, ram’s horn, and bubbles) explicit.
My role is to de-mystify Bates and Goodman’s use of the term “emergence,” by providing

11
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a mechanistic account of the emergence of grammar (in specific, an account of the
grammatical structures involved with past tense).
Nevertheless, without more definitive evidence, whether lexical and grammatical
development occur on the same or on different pathways remains unanswerable. The
evidence that Bates and Goodman offers might be regarded as dubious, moreover, for a
number o f methodological reasons (see “Problems” section). Another part o f my project
is to make clear that the possibility o f Bates and Goodman’s proposal (domain-generality)
being generalized to explain cross-linguistic data is largely an open-ended empirical
question. Either we can dig in the trenches looking for evidence for a structured lexicon
(e.g. for prototypical light Vs and the grammatical features they encode; Goldberg, 1999)
or for strong enough constraints on grammar’s emergence (Elman, 1999), or we can take
the view that we need to look at specific grammatical operations and determine what kind
of neural mechanisms these operations require (e.g. serial vs. parallel processors; Pinker,
1999),
It is possible that grammar and the lexicon are, in fact, modularized, though not
altogether informationally encapsulated, and implemented in very different types o f neural
architecture. The “almost lawful” correlation could in fact be a result of the independent
but simultaneous development of two interfaced modules, especially in light of the fact
that both lexical and grammatical operations must be performed for the production
(/comprehension) o f phrases and early sentences (i.e. beyond 18 months). When we look
at specific grammatical operations (e.g. regular and irregular past tense formation; Pinker,
1999), “words” and “rules” appear to be implemented in very different neural processors.

12
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It is an unnecessary move, though, to take the further step and claim that grammar is
representaiionally innate (Elman, 1996, 1999), but I think that most nativists would avoid
this obvious blunder.
Nowhere in the nativist literature (Chomsky, 1956, 1986, 1988; Pinker, 1989,
1994, 1999) is a claim made for representational innateness to the extent Elman (1999)
proposes (i.e. to the extent that KOL is directly encoded in the genome, that the genome
prespecifies all relevant synaptic connections for UG’s implementation). One o f the
criticisms brought to bear on Pinker (this paper) focuses on his failure to clarify how
certain genes ensure the wiring scheme that implements KOL. Vagueness is ultimately
Pinker's downfall, though in this case, it at least prevents him from being mis-categorized.
The representationally innate position, as sketched by Elman, is a straw-man position, and
when we throw this option out as a possible explanation of what nativists have in mind,
we are left with a toned-down version of innateness, just a shade stronger than the
emergentists’. Still, a shade’s difference could mean all the difference in this debate.
Chomsky (1986, 1988) and Pinker (1994) suggest that certain genes code for domainspecific linguistic (non-lexical) mechanisms; whereas Bates/Goodman and Elman (1999)
suggest that certain genes code for Aovcmn-general mechanisms which get used
throughout development for linguistic processing (and perhaps other non-linguistic
processing), and that the maturational schedule of these mechanisms actually acts as a
constraint on child language learning.

2.1 “Emergence” for Bates and Goodman:
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Bates and Goodman provide many examples of emergence (32-35), but the
“bubble” analogy is their first. The spherical shape of bubbles is accomplished not because
something in the bubbles necessitates this structure, but because it is the “only possible
solution to achieving maximum volume with minimum surface area” (32). The
mathematic law governing volume/surface area relations limits the architectural
possibilities to a single outcome. So long as soap and water come together (and basic
environmental conditions are met), this brute fact about the world stands in the way of
bubbles taking on alternative shapes (e.g. triangles or diamonds), and thus constrains them
into adopting the spherical design solution. This is an example of self-organizing design,
in the sense that the structure of bubbles is not prespecified in any of the properties of
soap and water. Bubbles find themselves in a spherical shape time and time again because
the world provides no other possible solution. The soap and water blindly follow local
constraints (i.e. mathematical facts about the world) and the outcome o f sphericalness
emerges.
Insofar as language is concerned, grammar “emerges” for Bates and Goodman
from interactions between lexical processes (/development) and a structured world—in this
case, the structure of the input. Bates and Goodman align themselves with Bates and
MacWhinney (1989), espousing the view that grammar (/logic) emerges because the
possible design solutions to the problem of mapping a rich set of meanings onto a limited
speech channel are constrained by limits of memory, perception, and motor planning (see
p. 33; also Elman, 1999). These limitations (memory, perception, motor planning) are, o f
course, governed by innate maturational constraints (our “internal clock” during

14
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ontogenesis); other innate constraints (e.g. unit, local, and global level architectural
constraints) on now-linguistic organs also play a role in simplifying the mapping problem.
This is precisely where Bates and Goodman’s view departs from traditional empiricism
{indirect prespecification), because the solution to the mapping problem is not derived
from learning alone. On the emergentist view, though, grammar is not genetic “all the
way down” (i.e. not directly, or representationally), but emerges from conservative genetic
interaction (genes coding for non-linguistic mechanisms like memory according to a
chronotopically innate schedules) with a structured environment. It is not entirely a fact
about the genes that kids possess knowledge of language, but a fact about the way the
world hangs together, and how this “hanging together” constrains certain outcomes. On
the emergentist view, then, grammar is to a large extent self-organizing.
To summarize: emergentists emphasize the way seemingly domain-specific
structures are generated as by-products of processes occurring in other domains,
processes which are essentially myopic to the overall plan or output. Linguistic structure
is not causally tied to a genetically prespecified, domain-specific language organ, but to (i)
conservative genetic interaction (e.g. “timing constraints” on the maturational schedule o f
memory which elicit the “less is more” effect, see Newport, 1990 & Elman, 1999)
governing the development o f mechanisms within the domain of general cognition, (ii) the
inherent processes of associative memory (see “ Single Mechanism” section) and other
general cognitive mechanisms (e.g. see Newport, 1999), and (iii) structural regularities in
the input (environmental).
Bates and Goodman also refer to emergence as non-predictability: “outcomes can
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arise for reasons that are not obvious or predictable from any of the individual inputs into
the problem [e.g. soap, water, etc.]” (32), but they would probably agree (to avoid occult
forces) that once you do have a mechanistic account of all the relevant constraints which
govern, for example, soap-environment, soap-water, water-environment interactions, you
can predict how the lower level needs to be “fixed” in order to produce the higher-level
phenomenon (i.e. spherical bubbles). Emergence as non-predictability, for Bates and
Goodman, is thus an epistemological form of emergence, characterizing what we
presently do not know about configuring the lower-level properties o f the lexicon and
meeting basic environmental conditions to compel grammar’s emergence (i.e. to account
mechanistically for grammar’s emergence in terms of maturational constraints; Newport,
1990 & Elman, 1999, as well as other general cognitive constraints, Gupta & Dell, 1999,
Newport et a l , 1999, and so on). The chore, which Bates and Goodman fail to
adequately do in this article, is to explicate the lower level mechanisms that facilitate
grammar’s emergence. We should be careful not to let any “pinches of magic” into our
account and assume that we could never uncover the relevant constraints governing
grammar (or bubble formation). In fact, we are well on our way to uncovering the
relevant constraints when it comes to grammar, and considerable progress has already
been made.
Bates and Goodman add to their running definition of emergence that the spherical
form o f bubbles is “not explained by the soap, the water, or the little boy who blows the
bubble,” which indicates a sense of non-additivity, that is, that the whole (the spherical
shape) is not just the sum of its parts (soap, water, etc.). The outcome in emergent
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processes is not prespecified in any individual property or input to the problem. All
inputs, plus constraints in the world, account for the bubble’s emergence. So for language
(specifically past tense), the relevant constraints are as follows: the architecture and
developmental rate of lexicon, which is itself constrained by the architecture and
developmental rate of whatever general learning mechanisms subserve it (see also the “less
is more” hypothesis; Newport, 1990); the structure of the input (e.g. ratio of regular to
irregular past tense forms), and the regularities occurring therewith; social factors (Snow,
1999), for example, the fact that kids are innately constrained to attract and engage in
social interaction in general; innate «o^i-linguistic mechanisms used for linguistic tasks
(Newport et al., 1999); and language itself, co-evolving with our brains, “shifting” due to
evolutionary pressures to make it assimilate more readily into the brains of our children
(Deacon, 1997). A complex synergy involving all factors is what “fixes,” or forces the
outcome o f child language acquisition. Unlike non-predictability, non-additivity is not an
epistemological claim about what we currently do not know about fixing the lower-level
properties, but a claim about how the outcome (grammatical structure) is generated.
Grammar, as non-additive, is not a direct result of a grammar module’s inherent
architecture and developmental rate, but an indirect by-product of all these forces doing
their own local jobs (each being more or less “dumb” to the other’s job or to some plan of
design).
Extending the analogy, grammatical representations are not defined by a
prespecified “blueprint” o f neural microcircuitry mediating UG (again, this claim is largely
left for other researchers to haggle over, e.g. Elman 1999), nor can grammatical
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processing be traced to a ûomzLm-specific module (this is the central issue for Bates and
Goodman). Even in cases of SLI, where specifically linguistic operations are affected,
there is no need to invoke the independent development hypothesis (that language-specific
and general learning mechanisms develop on separate pathways). It is equally (if not
more) feasible to consider «ow-linguistic factors in SLI.
Children with SLI score significantly below age-matched controls on at least some
non-linguistic measures, including mental imagery and mental rotation (Johnson
1994), symbolic play (Thai & Katich 1996), and shifting attention (Townsend,
Wulfeck, Nichols, & Koch 1995). Tallal and her associates proposed that specific
vulnerability of morphology is a by-product o f a subtle deficit in the ability to
perceive rapid temporal sequences of auditory stimuli. (B&G, 63)
From the developmental perspective, a perceptual, acoustic, or general cognitive
deficiency (or all three) early on could lead to large-scale changes in the outcome (i.e. to
SLI). What would traditionally be called performance constraints affect SLI patients’
competence, or at least hamper the grammar module from reaching whatever threshold of
input it requires to “turn on” its innate mechanism (in other words, for kids to hone in on
the appropriate rules for the appropriate language).
As a by-product of interactions among three non-linguistic factors, SLI is itself a
sort o f “emergent,” self-organized outcome. There is no need to posit a single, damaged
gene (or set o f genes) which codes for the precise wiring of the inflectional system, and
what follows, that SLI is thus a direct genetic outcome. The genes involved in the disease
are not dedicated to prespecifying an inflectional “blueprint,” and probably serve either
directly or indirectly in a multitude of different functions, many of which are general
cognitive functions (see “Discussion” section-multifunctional genes). Genetic impairment
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in SLI does not directly shut down the production of a morphology network in the brain.
It does shut down, or at least impair, various general cognitive mechanisms (the acoustic
system, attention directing or attention sustaining systems, mechanisms involved in mental
imaging, etc.), and this, in turn, shuts down the production o f a mature inflectional system.
If the acoustic system is impaired, SLI patients would find it more difficult to detect the
aflfixal components of words, which are generally the least perceptually salient
components^
If we entertain the possibility that grammar and the lexicon might be mediated by
the same domain-general mechanism, then we can further entertain the possibility that SLI
results from damage to that mechanism. This would explain not only the linguistic
impairments SLI patients suffer, but also their /?o;?-linguistic impairments, which nativists
cannot easily account for (nativists generally look for a dissociation between grammatical
and general cognitive abilities). The problem with interpreting SLI as an emergent
outcome is that we must assume that Bates and Goodman are correct about domaingenerality in the first place.
My difficulty with Bates and Goodman’s examples of emergence is that they do
not match up exactly with the emergence of grammar. Take, for instance, the bubbles
analogy. When soap and water combine, there is only one contributing factor to the
outcome which guarantees “maximum volume with minimum surface area,” namely that
^Stress in inflected English words rarely falls on the inflectional suffix. In other languages where stress falls on
the suffix more often (e.g. Spanish preterite), it may prim a face seem easier to overcome this deficit, but upon
closer examination, this option is improbable. Languages that stress inflectional affixes are usually highly
inflectional languages, so the likelihood of en or increases as the possibility for acoustic deficiency decreases.
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mathematical law which governs volume/surface area relations. But clearly this is too
direct a constraint in terms grammar's emergence. Grammar is the result of a whole
collocation o f domain-general processes, but it is clearly not such a direct and
overwhelming “forced move.” There are an infinite number of possible hypotheses that
children could form about which rules are applicable to their particular language, and what
the rules are to start with (Chomsky, 1986, 1988). Not just one factor contributes to a
child’s ability to overcome this induction problem. It is a much more subtle affair, a
“conspiracy” of mechanisms in Elman’s terms (1999).
The bee analogy (32) portrays a much less direct process by which honeycomb
structures emerge.
When a bee returns to the hive after collecting pollen, she deposits a drop o f waxcoated honey. Each of these honey balls is round and approximately the same size.
As these balls get packed together, they take on the familiar hexagonal shape that
we see in the honeycomb. There is no gene in the bee that codes for hexagonality
in the honeycomb, nor is there any overt communication regarding the shaping o f
the cells of the honeycomb. Rather, this form is an emergent consequence o f the
application of packing rules to a collection of honey balls of roughly uniform size.
(MacWhinney, 1999)
The regular structure of the honeycomb arises from the interaction of forces that
wax balls exert on each other when compressed. The honeycomb can be described
by a rule, but the mechanism which produces it does not contain any statement o f
this rule [my italics]. (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1988)
Lacking both a genetically prespecified “blueprint” for honeycombs and a way to
communicate a common design with one another, bees simply follow local constraintssnifFing out chemicals, secreting substances—and the structure emerges time and time
again. The local constraints governing the interaction of wax deposits—“packing rules,”
laws o f physics, laws of molecular chemistry, physiological mechanics, behavioral
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regularities in other domains—interact in the packing process, and honeycombs emerge.
There is clearly some sense in which this behavior has evolved, but we need not appeal
solely to natural selection (and further, direct genetic encoding) to explicate the
mechanisms that account for it. Self-organizational mechanisms do just fine; in fact,
because honeycomb construction occurs in the absence o f direct genetic encoding, a
genetic determinist’s account of the honeycomb phenomenon would be flat wrong.
Nevertheless, Bates and Goodman fall short of specifying, for the case of
grammar, what exactly these local constraints are, or by what mechanisms grammar
emerges from the lexicon. Bates and Goodman appeal to statistical regularities in
childrens’ vocabularies—“critical mass” effects resulting from vocabulary size, threshold
levels o f lexical proficiency before grammar can kick in, etc.—but a sheer bulk of
vocabulary items in the lexicon cannot, by itself, ensure the emergence o f grammar.
Vocabulary size may be one of the contributing factors to grammar’s emergence, but it is
far too weak a constraint on its own. In theory, one could learn an enormous number o f
vocabulary items in a given language, yet fail to know how to string them together into an
acceptable sentence.
Moreover, Bates and Goodman’s inference from these data (vocab/grammar
correlations) is itself unwarranted. Because lexical performance is lawfully correlated
with grammatical performance throughout childhood (correlation), grammar must be
subserved by the same domain-general mechanism as the lexicon (causation). There is
no further step in Bates and Goodman’s project to show us how particular grammatical
operations are implemented by lexical mechanisms, and they have to b e -a t least
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throughout early stages in development—because we apparently only have one mechanism
(unless, o f course, we entertain alternative explanations). For past tense, then, the list of
questions remains: if a critical mass of vocabulary items needs to be met in order to trigger
grammatical processes, what ratio of regular to irregular verbs must there be to ensure a
standard acquisition rate? To what extent are irregularization or regularization errors a
factor o f this ratio (environment), or a factor of innate architecture (this latter part of the
question pertains even to general learning mechanisms)? And the list goes on for past
tense and for other structures. Although researchers have filled in many of the gaps. Bates
and Goodman’s immediate claims (domain-generality, a lack of dissociation) should really
stand or fall by their own data. When it comes to their own data, however, their claims go
grossly under-supported. Not only is the logic of their argument flawed
(correlation=>causation), but more problematically, they fail to clarity the lexical
mechanisms whereby particular grammatical structures emerge. Thus, their use of the
term “emergence” requires further clarification, appeal to outside sources of data, or
redefinition altogether.

2.2 Problems with Bates and Goodman’s D ata:
One problem with Bates and Goodman’s data is that it is performance data, and
Chomsky, for example, would likely just throw this out as an invalid and unreliable
indicator o f grammatical competence. Children possess tacit knowledge of language,
which should be tested as well (“teased out”) to determine precisely when specific
grammatical structures are acquired, and which linguistic principles are being applied.
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Without an account o f hwwledge o f langiiage (competence), we have no grounds for
linking grammar (what would this be?) to the lexicon. The problem is unavoidable for
Bates and Goodman, whose data is primarily based on parental reports which document
performance, unless we abandon the competence-performance distinction altogether (as it
turns out, some view this as the most sensible alternative'*).
Another problem is that the data for grammatical proficiency at various stages in
the sample’s development are based on MLU (mean length of utterance) scores. A
standard complaint in applied linguistics is that MLU scores are cross-culturally unreliable.
Comparing the scores of an English toddler with those of a Spanish speaker is inequitable
because the English toddler can get a score of 1-word-in-length for “go,” but it is unclear
whether the Spanish toddler should get a 1 or 2-word-in-length score for “va” (“go,” or
“you go,” also “ he goes,” “it goes,” or “she goes”). In highly inflected languages, this
problem can mean a margin of error of 2-4 words (e.g. in Spanish, “c/awe/o” can be
interpreted as 5 words, “you give it to me”). This is an astronomical number on the
developmental scale, translating into a difference of over 20 months^! Bates and Goodman
anticipate this problem, and offer corroborating data from Italian, a language more richly
inflected than English. Their hypotheses are confirmed by Caselli and Casadio (1995) in
the Italian data (presumably having controlled for the MLU problem), but still this means
that we only have two cases, that of English and Italian, upon which to base our general
theory o f grammar (and of how and whence grammar emerges).

“Vor example, Givon (1999) characterizes the distinction as a “radical sanitization o f the facts of natural
language use,” a “logical sleight of hand” (83-4).
^Wittgenstein addresses this problem in a different context at the beginning of the PI (p. 9e).
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The third problem is the potential “apples and oranges” discrepancy in drawing a
developmental link between grammar and the lexicon (40). For example, there is a
remarkably strong correlation between the development o f the big toe and the
development of grammatical abilities, “up to the ceiling,” so to speak, but this does not
imply that functions o f the big toe and grammatical operations are mediated by the same
mechanism. Nevertheless, does the “apples and oranges” criticism have anything to say
about what we are interested in, grammar and the lexicon? The lexicon, unlike the big
toe, is at least a device that serves a linguistic function, so the correlation does seem to be
a more reasonable one. Both are imperative for language (beyond an 8 month babbling
stage) to even get off the ground. It is questionable, though, from Bates and Goodman’s
data alone, that grammar nmst emerge from the lexicon (without clearly defining what this
means), and further, that both nmst be subserved by non-linguistic mechanisms (this latter
inference is the most controversial).
Nativists offer striking evidence to suggest that linguistic and non-linguistic
development are, in fact, modularized. Smith and Tsimpli (1991) report on a 29 year old
mentally handicapped individual with a non-verbal IQ averaging between 60 and 70, who
enjoys native proficiency in English and remarkable proficiency in a number o f other
languages (Ouhalla 1999; 4). Curtiss (1981) and Yamada (1990) report additional cases
in which linguistic proficiency is negatively correlated with general cognitive skills. With
evidence such as this, the nativist is able to take the same data (Bates and Goodman’s) and
interpret it as the development of an interface between grammar and the lexicon. This
could be seen as a problem for Bates and Goodman because they propose that
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grammatical and lexical operations are mediated by the same mechanism throughout
childhood.
Even connectionist networks modeling aspects of lexical and grammatical
development frequently find themselves committed to modularity. The connectionist
models o f past tense (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1988; Plunkett & Marchman, 1991, 1993;
Daugherty & Seidenberg, 1994, 1999), for example, are all committed to at least a
phonology module, which decodes the input signal into a readable form for the network,
and encodes the network’s output into the projected English pronunciation for each given
past tense form. Multi-layered processing of this sort operates according to principles
similar to those governing serial processing, one layer’s function depending upon
another’s in a serial, unidirectional manner. Some modelers build in further complexity to
their networks by adding a “context” or “hidden” layer to serve more specialized jobs than
the network as the whole (i.e. the formation of “internal representations,” see footnote
11). Most connectionists would nevertheless happily agree to modularity in strict
connectionist terms (i.e. multi-layered processing). It is the very nature o f connectionist
processing that is of central concern, not hair-splitting over the definition of “modularity .”
It is the realization that there is a necessity for such models to demonstrate how
mechanically and mathematically higher-level “lawful” psychological behaviors can be
implemented at the lower neural level.
We must be careful, nonetheless, to keep the issues cleanly apart. Bates and
Goodman call for reassessment of a number of different nativist assumptions: (i)
innateness, (ii) modularity, or information encapsulation, that is, that grammatical and
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lexical processes are kept distinct except at their interface (see Fodor, Modularity o f the
Mind, 1983), and (iii) domain-specificity, or encapsulation of one specific domain of
processing (“grammar” set off from the “lexicon,” “syntax” from “semantics,” and so on),
in other words, one mechanism (grammar) serving one class o f stimuli and only one, and
the lexicon following suit. A function can be localized (i.e. routinely subserved by
mechanisms in a predictable neural region), and simultaneously serve other classes of
stimuli. Agrammatic patients with damage to Broca’s area, for example, have trouble
processing and detecting suffixes, less salient word endings, and inflections (Pinker, 1999:
248); so we can safely say that before trauma this function (inflection) was localized (after
all, damage to the region leads to direct and specific impairment). But Broca’s area has
also been found to serve other classes of stimuli (e.g. in nonverbal motor planning, see
B&G, 1999: 65). Thus, localization is not equivalent to domain-specificity. Nonetheless,
a function cannot be domain-specific without being modularized, which is precisely why
Bates and Goodman appear to conflate the two notions in their article. It is argued (see
“Discussion” section) that the domain-specificity/modularity relationship need not hold the
other way around (modularity=>domain-specificity), so long as we re-focus our definition
o f modularity in terms o f multi-layered processing. Still, the more standard notion o f
modularity (a la Fodor) should be applied to the dual-route theories o f past tense
presented by Chomsky & Halle (1968) and Pinker (1999). In each theory, the two notions
(Fodorian modularity/domain-specificity) indeed go hand and hand.

3.0 A Single Mechanism for Past Tense—Simulations o f Emergent Processes:
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3.1 Implementations—
All connectionist models o f human behavior follow from the basic assumption that
the behaviors they mimic are functions o f associative memory. Any instance o f
“knowledge o f language,” or better, any “generalization about language,” emerges in
connectionist networks in a more or less bottom-up fashion. Thus, connectionist models
stand in direct opposition to nativist models, as knowledge of language is in no sense built
into the networks, the networks in no sense “knowing” the rules which merely describe
their behavior. For this very reason, connectionist models exemplify some basic
emergentist principles. Processing in one domain (general associative memory), in
combination with other non-linguistic constraints (“maturational” constraints on memory),
beget what appears to be lawful, rule-governed behavior in an entirely different domain
(grammar)^.
From the operation of “dumb” local mechanisms (nodes, connections) comprising
associative memory, what might be described as “grammatical knowledge” emerges, even
though no rules of grammar are actually programmed into the network. The network’s
behavior can be characterized as lawful, but no prespecified rules (specific to linguistic
systems) govern its function. Associative memory is, of course, governed by rules, but
these rules determine elements of general cognition, and are not characteristic of the
linguistic system per se (e.g. Hume’s laws of contiguity—\{ A appears with B, associate
them -and resemblance—\f A looks like B, let B share A’s associations. Pinker 1999: 104).

^See Elman (1999) for techniques on how to model maturational constraints in connectionist nets. Also, note
that “emergence” is being used here in the strict sense of “developmental emergence,” as defined by
MacWhinney (1999: xi). Elsewhere I allude to biological (evolutionary) emergence, but these issues should be
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Linguistic knowledge, or generalization, is a function of the domain-general processes of
associative memory, not a function o f a domain-specific grammar module. Whatever
structure or systematicity emerges in the network ultimately finds its source in association.
Thus, connectionism is essentially a “memory all the way down” model of language and
human behavior. From a structured training set and local associative processes, complex
behaviors emerge in an altogether different domain (such as language). If we accept
connectionist networks as valid homologues to certain key aspects of human brains (at
least at some level of analysis), we begin to recognize them as tangible models of how
associative mechanisms can overcome the apparent “induction problem” (Chomsky, 1986,
1988).

3.2 The M odel's Job—
Given a problem, connectionist networks generalize over patterns in memory to
derive a solution. Any similarities between input and stored data affect the structure and
clustering o f features recorded in memory. Similar features are clustered together; so
when making predictions about novel inputs, connectionist nets search their databases for
similarities between features of the input and features of previous (stored) inputs. If
similarities are detected, the network makes a prediction that the novel input must be
computed similarly to the analogous one(s) stored in memory. New items are therefore
“learned” on analogy, but only after the network has been adequately trained on a certain

kept separate.
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number o f stem/past tense pairs.
For past tense formation, this would mean that (at least) the phonetic features of
irregulars with similar stems and similar change patterns would form patterns in
associative memory. A certain “training set” would be introduced to the network to
provide it with a database to work with. In this case, the training set would consist of
stems and fully inflected forms, and the resulting database would consist of features o f
stems and fully inflected forms, overlapping where similar. Training replicates input and
learning, a certain amount of which is required to “switch on” the inflectional system (to
this end, even generativists concede the importance o f input). To model the transition
from stage 1 to stage 2, for example, it has to be assumed that a certain number o f correct
irregular and regular forms (and types) have made it into the lexicon. And to model stage
3, we would need an even greater number.
Generativists might object that training is “cheating” in a sense, because it flies in
the face o f the “poverty of stimulus” argument (Chomsky, 1986; 1988). It is arguable,
however, that criticisms of this nature misinterpret what really happens during training.
During training, the teacher signal only flags that some discrepancy has been found, not
how to fix it. It just indicates that something has gone wrong, but not exactly what has
gone wrong. There is no teacher to say, “That’s not how we say it; we say ‘walked.’”
About the only thing a teacher would be saying in this case is “Oops.” If walk gets
inputted and comes out wooked (god forbid), the network adjusts the connections to the
units which misfired (as well as the threshold value for those units). It “hunts and pecks”
until it stumbles across the right answer, but it never gives the right answer. In fact, it is
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“news to itself’ that it has the right answer. Training is thus a more or less bottom-up
process.
If the network has been trained on walk-walked, and when subsequently fed /wak/,
outputs /wakid/ instead of /wakl/, it compares the incorrect output with the correct form
in memory, and the network’s weights change according to its “learning rule” (which
conveys a “dumb” mechanical operation, like “add .2,” or “subtract .8"—an algorithm).
Likewise, if a child entering stage 2, whose lexicon contains an instance of walk-walked
(memorized “rote” in Stage 1), produces /wakId/ (say, due to performance constraints),
the child’s associative memory would most likely detect that /wakid/contains features not
shared by the dominant pattern, and would cluster it separately (as a “working
hypothesis”). The more and more walk-walked is used correctly in the future, and the
more and more regulars are added to the stem-stem and change-change pattern, the less
and less robust the “working hypothesis” pattern becomes; thus, walk-wooked becomes an
increasingly less likely candidate for use in past tense computation.
When given a novel stem, the network in a sense “blends” features of the stored
past tense forms of similar sounding (and meaning) verbs. For example, given the novel
verb “spling,” the network would (i) represent it as a certain distinct set of features
(phonetic, semantic, both, or others), (ii) cluster this set of features with similar ones in
memory (the “lexicon”), and either (iii) superimpose the /e/ sound onto /spl_Q/ to produce
“splang” on analogy to spring—>sprang (or to other members of the ing-ang-tmg family),
or (iv) generalize the most probable change in featural sets (add /d /-if /d/ is indeed the
most common overlapping feature of past tenses in memory at the point when “spling” is
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inputted); (iv) occurs in the case that other change patterns (i.e. irregular ones) are not
strong enough to attract the novel verb into their families. Clearly, then, one of the chief
concerns for modelers of English past tense is what amount, type, and distribution of
featural sets in memory (e.g. the ratio of regular to irregular verbs) acts as a constraint on
past tense learning.

4.0 The Rumelhart and McClelland Model:
In the 1980s, Rumelhart and McClelland (hereafter R&M) and the PDF research
group sent a shock wave throughout the scientific community with their claim that highly
lawful human behavior can be implemented in a system that follows no explicit rules. The
successes of connectionist models challenge nativists to reconsider their biases toward
language acquisition, or at least to reconsider specifically what behaviors are a function of
associative memory (general cognition) as opposed to a function of grammar. R&M’s
success at modeling past tense has challenged more traditional rule-driven models o f the
inflectional system to reassess whether “rules of grammar” characterize the inherent
construction and mechanistic procedure of the system, or whether they are mere
epiphenomena of some other domain of processes (the tools of descriptive linguists).
If R&M are correct that regular and irregular past tense can be successfully
learned by their network, then the model is at least beneficial to show that there may be a
more viable alternative model to rule-based, modular theories; this could at least lead to
revisions o f more traditional symbolic moûtls—revisionist connectionism (e.g. Pinker's
revision o f the lexicon in the dual-route account). If R&M are further correct that past
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tense is learned by a sort of domain-general pattern associator in human brains, then we
can either (i) eliminate the more traditional symbolic theories (this would be the most
radical mowe—eliminaiive connectionism—in which case “rules of grammar” would be
inexact descriptions of both higher and lower level processes), or (ii) explore
connectionist networks as models of how higher-level symbolic processes are
implemented at the lower level, in which case “rules of grammar” would be exact
descriptions at the higher level but only approximate descriptions at the lower level
{“implementational” connectionsm). Establishing that past tense is subserved by domaingeneral mechanisms is a project left for other researchers, outside of R&M’s immediate
scope. Thus, they can only establish that PDFs can learn past tense, and that this may be
the right model to go with.
R&M model past tense formation in an attempt to show that past tense can be
learned without explicit unconscious rules (i.e. with absolutely no KOL built in). To do
this successfully, R&M’s network needs to accurately model the three-stage u-shaped
learning curve, which has now become standard in the study of past tense (Brown, 1973;
Ervin, 1964; Kuczaj, 1977). In stage 1, kids use a small handful o f verbs in the past tense.
These are usually the highest frequency verbs (“light verbs,” do-did, go-went, put-put,
make-made, give-gave, and others like eat-ate, walk-walked, play-played), the majority of
which are irregulars. Kids in stage 1 use the correct forms most of the time, and make few
mistakes, as their lexicon has not yet been cluttered by the surge of novel forms.
The transition from stage 1 to stage 2 is where the controversy gets thick, as it has
elsewhere been taken as evidence for implicit KOL (Pinker&Prince, 1988, 1994; Pinker,
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1999). By stage 2, kids have built upon their limited repertoires of verbs from stage 1,
and more and more regulars have seeped into their lexicons (the ratio o f regulars to
irregulars is spreading). In stage 2, kids begin to generalize the regular rule to most novel
forms, and overgeneralize it to irregular forms, even to ones they have routinely gotten
correct in stage 1. Pinker (1999) sees the transition to stage 2 as indicative of separate
mechanisms for words and rules. If a child says “walked” for the past tense of ‘walk,’ she
may have just memorized the past form, but if she predicts the past tense of the novel verb
‘plick’ is “plicked,” there is evidence that she implicitly “knows” the regular rule. Further,
if Pinker can show that regularization of novel stems has little or nothing to do with the
frequency and distribution o f the input, we have evidence that the onset of the rule
mechanism’s operation (at beginning of Stage 2) is motivated by factors outside the
domain o f lexical learning. Nevertheless, if R&M can demonstrate that their model not
only replicates the u-shaped learning curve, but also overgeneralizes the regular rule to
novel stems in stage 2, then we have a viable alternative to rule-based, dual-mechanism
theories.
In stage 3, regularization of novel stems continues, but kids have regained their
ability to produce the correct irregular past tenses. Clusters of exceptions begin forming
in memory, e.g. the ing-ang-ung family, and the inflectional system stabilizes. Once
clusters o f exceptions form, the tendency to make irregularization errors increases, as
patterns in memory attract candidate stems to their change class based on stem-stem
similarities. Thus, in stage 2, the novel verb “spling” would most probably be regularized,
although in stage 3, when the ing-ang-ung change family has gained strength, it may resist
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the dominant regular pattern to be irregularized (especially where there is only one
featural difference, e.g. between “spling” [^lateral] and “spring” [-lateral]). In stage 3, the
number o f regulars in the lexicon outweighs the number of irregulars, so the irregular
pattern has to be incredibly robust for irregularization to occur.

4.1 Patterns—
R&M designed a connectionist network which decodes phonologically represented
input sequences (verb stems, past tense forms) into distinct sets of features. During
training, the model is fed the phonological representation of both the stem of a verb and its
past tense (e.g. /ækt/, “act,” and /æktid/, “acted”). Each node codes for groups of 3
phonemes (Wickelphones), so /ækt/ would be decoded as {#æk, ækt, kt#}, and the 3
nodes coding for {#æk}, {ækt}, and {kt#} (respectively) would fire upon input. The
Wickelphone encoding solution allows R&M to represent words in as “distributed”
representations, without forfeiting their distinctness. If each node coded for a single
phoneme (rather than 3), every last bit of positional information would be lost upon input
(e.g. the difference between “tip” and “pit” would be lost because the same nodes would
fire for each, see Pinker, 1999: 111-3). A model that encodes words as featural sets
without segmenting them in some fashion would not be able to represent words with
overlapping featural sets (e.g. tip-pit, slit-silt, etc.). Even “slit” and “silt’ remain distinct
under such a model: /slit/—>{#sl, sll, lit. It#} while /silt/—>{#sl, sll, lit, It#}, each with no
two Wickelphones in common.
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The trouble with the Wickelphone solution is that there are too many o f them, and
they are too specific. Assuming that we distinguish 35 different phonemes, the
number o f Wickelphones would be 35^, or 42, 875, not even counting the
Wickelphones containing word boundaries. And, if we postulate one input unit
and one output unit in our model for each Wickelphone, we require a rather large
connection matrix (4.3 x 10'*) to represent all their possible connections.
To avoid the problem o f hyper-complexity, R&M boiled Wickelphones down into
Wickelfeatures, each Wickelphone defined by a distinct set o f Wickelfeatures. Each node,
then, codes for a specific set of 3 features (one for each phoneme in each Wickelphone).
For example, a node that encodes [[+silibant], [^lateral], [+high]] (respectively) would fire
for the Wickelphone {sll} (from “slit”), and other nodes would fire for {sll} according to
the same criterion (e.g. a node encoding [[-voice], [+voice], [+front]] would also fire).
When all is said and done, nodes encoding the features [+vocalic], [+high], [+front],
[-long] would all fire for the III in “slit” (ditto for the rest of slit's phonemes and their
relevant features), rendering the representation distinct from all others (e.g. distinct from
the representation for “slot”).
Phonetic features offer a significantly more compact way of representing the
elements that make up words. Thirty-five phonemes can be represented using only 16
features. Each phoneme in a given Wickelphone is assigned a value (0 or 1) for each of
the 16 features. This means that the preceding and following “context” phonemes (e.g. /p/
& it! in the Wickelphone /pit/ from {#pl, pit. It#}) are also assigned featural values.
Context information is recorded by memory in order to formulate stem-stem and changechange patterns. Due to its features, /pit/ might fall into the hit-hit pattern, and later, into
the regular “add /-Id/} [+cons, +dental]_” pattern based on stem-stem and especially stem-
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final similarities, /pit/ ending in a dental consonant. Without context phonemes,
generalization would be a highly inefficient mode of learning, as there would be little
information in terms o f stem-stem similarities upon which to base generalization. Since
the difference between “silt” and “slit” would be lost, for example, the network would
never be able to predict any difference between their past tense forms (using “silt” as a V
here), even though “to silt” always goes silted, yet “to slit” can either go slitted or slit.
In R&M’s network, words are distributed representations; that is, words are
represented by a distinct pattern o f activation over the input units, each unit encoding a
particular set of features (i.e. whatever input units “fire,” or get fed a “ I,” represent a
given word). No single unit codes for a single word, and the same unit gets re-used in
many different representations (e.g. units coding for [+vocalic, +high, +front] might fire
for any word with an IV or an /i/). Predicted past tense forms are represented by whatever
pattern o f activation occurs over the output units. Just as neurons perform only simple
mechanical operations (get excited, fire ballistically, etc.), so too do nodes (units). Since
each output unit has a threshold value, not only does the learning rule adjust the weights if
an error is detected, it also slightly lowers or raises the threshold value for the output
nodes. During training, modelers note the output pattern of activation for each word that
gets run though, stems and past tense forms alike, so that each input has a predictable
output; this way modelers have the ability to know when an error occurs (i.e. when the
expected pattern is different from the actual one)
Whenever there is a discrepancy between the target output (stored in memory after
being learned) and the actual response, in other words, whenever a certain set o f nodes
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representing the target output are supposed to fire but “miss,” the learning rule kicks in to
mechanically adjust the network’s weights (it also adjusts the threshold values of the
deviant output units). The “weights” in R&M’s network are numeric values which fill the
variables o f its learning algorithm (e.g. ‘X - 2/output = “ 1” & target = “0,”’ or ‘Y+.8/o=0
& t= l ’ [simplified for clarity]). These values represent the strength o f connectivity
between input and output nodes. In neural terms, we would be talking about how
dedicated a neural synapse (axon-dendrite interface) is to a given stimulus (e.g. in
localized fiinctions, the neural pathway gets routinely entrenched by the same stimulus—a
highly connected system). According to one of its uses, the computational “neural”
network, or connectionist network, is essentially a mathematical, algorithmic metaphor for
lower level processes—for “neural information sharing.” Connectionism thus provides an
“abstract neurology” (as it is often put, e.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) for implementing
higher-level theories of behavior. Connectionist networks are mechanisms designed to
receive some bit of numerically encoded information (for our purposes, verb stems) and
compute an output value based on computations across weights.
The value “ 1” represents a node firing (a certain bit of information being inputted),
so if a node fires, we have “ 1” times the value of the weight, say, . 2 , which equals .2 (our
output). If the threshold value of a connected output unit is above .2 (say, it’s 1), the unit
doesn’t fire. If the unit that didn’t fire causes a mis-match between the actual output and
the target vector, the learning rule kicks in. The learning rule adjusts the weights (e.g.
‘Y+.8/o=0 & t= l,’ so '.2 +.8=1,’ the node fires), as well as the threshold value (“ 1” in our
example, so we’re guaranteed a “hit”). All things being equal, an input that causes an
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error can be re-fed to the network, and the weights and threshold values will eventually
stabilize. Stable states o f the network are signs of robust patterns in memory. If a novel
input has features that are strongly associated, modelers can predict (approximately) what
weight settings and threshold values they need to activate the target (based on patterns of
activation and connectivity for computing similar inputs). The behavior of stable systems
can rightly be characterized as lawful. “Rules,” as descriptions of lawful behavior, are also
distributed, in that they capture a certain pattern of connectivity between input and output
nodes (i.e. whatever pattern of weight settings and threshold values is required to fire only
those output nodes representing the correct form for a particular class).
Words are also “distributed” in a different (but related) sense, insofar as they are
stored as sets of features overlapping with other sets where similar features are shared. As
such, words are bits and pieces of “shared” phonological information (features).
Outputted past tense forms for novel verbs are essentially “blends” of features from the
input sequence with features of past tense forms of similar stems in memory. Because
words are nothing but sets of features in R&M’s network, memory is not taxed by
needless information. Memory encodes only the minimal amount of information needed
to distinguish words and compute their past tenses.
The “-ed rule,” or better, the “-ed generalization,” is implemented in whatever
pattern o f activation and connectivity elicits a particular regular past tense. In a sense,
then, each past tense form gets its own mini-rule. The more robust a pattern in memory
gets, the more stable the pattern of connectivity; that is, the “setting” of weights used to
compute verbs with similar features gets more and more regular (but rarely is it identical).
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The “average” weight settings for each verb in a particular class would approximate the
“general rule” for that class, but “rule” here would merely be a descriptive term (rules are
not explicitly programmed into the network, or prescriptions for behavior). The most
stable pattern o f connectivity, reflective o f the most robust pattern in memory, is what
could be called the “most regular rule.”
No input-output connections are hard-wired (weights preset) to compute regular
verbs (nor could we point to anything we could rightly call a “word” in any single unit). A
word inputted over and over again sparks a somewhat novel pattern of connectivity each
time it is processed. As training increases, words more or less take the same pattern, so
really we can at best make probabilistic predictions about the network’s next state. The
sense o f “implemented rule” gets extremely muddled in connectionist systems. Mini-rules
have no variables, containing only those values that have been inputted into a particular
computation (only those values o f a particular cluster of “words”); or at best, it contains
an average o f these values. At the level of nodes and connections, nothing falling under
the rubric “rule of grammar” is prespecified. No node follows the explicit program “add ed.” Regardless, the structure emerges. From a linguist’s perspective, it is a consequence
o f highly lawful linguistic behavior (rule application), but the only rules at work at the
lower level are general associative rules.
Innate KOL could be modeled by hard-wiring, or prespecifying, certain weights
and threshold values. But this would undercut the very goal of connectionism, which is to
model KOL without built-in explicit rules. Words and rules in connectionist networks are
thus like virtual entities. Bits and pieces of featural segments generated by the network to
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constitute a predicted past tense form are analyzed into coherent words upon output.
Words are therefore both “causal” and “analytic” emergents (see Appelbaum, 2000).
Outputs for novel stems are structures (distinct sets o f features) causally generated from
domain-general processes o f association, yet they reflect the operation of a linguistic rule.
Moreover, the only representations that are generated for words are distributed, which
leads us to the second sense in which words are emergent. Distributed representations—
generated by “blending” features—are subsequently analyzed as strings o f phonemes, that
is, as coherent “wholes” (at least we hear them as such). The decoder mechanism built
into R&M’s network would handle the task of “analysis.” For reasons of tedium, R&M
sent only a subset o f featural sets (outputs) through the decoder; in fact, they were the
ones who interpreted the rest of the output patterns (Pinker & Prince, 1988; also see
R&M, pp. 269-271). Their model is primarily concerned with causally generating
structures. As a model of the way we compute past tense, however, we would have to
appeal to some level o f analysis at which words appear to be coherent “wholes.”
Because “rules” in R&M’s network are generalizations over patterns in memory,
or stable states of the network, regularity is essentially subregularity. We can describe the
network’s subregularities with talk of “rules,” but the rule remains unspecified. When we
get down to the level of nodes and connections, all we have are local, “dumb” mechanical
operations in an entirely different domain. In a sense, then, rules are analytic emergents as
well. They characterize the average distribution of connectivity required to compute
members of a robust class, or the weight settings that naturally fall out of patterns in
memory. From a psychological persepective, though, children seem to apply the rule
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which characterizes these subregularities—"add -ed”—especially in stage 3, so R&M’s
network arguably shows us only one level o f the process (i.e. the lower level).
Without explicitly programmed grammatical rules, R&M’s model succeeded at
modeling the u-shaped learning curve for past tense formation. The 460 verbs it was
trained on were then run through the model, stems only, and it predicted all 460 o f the
correct past tense forms. More importantly, when novel irregular stems were run through
it, the model achieved an 85% success rate, and a 90% success rate with novel regulars
(261). (See tables 1 and 2.) Not only does the model demonstrate the presence o f stable
patterns in memory—so much so that the patterns attract novel verbs to their class,
potentially causing irregularization errors (mimicking late stage 2 and stage 3)—it also
demonstrates productivity when it comes to regular past tense. If irregular patterns aren’t
strong enough and novel stems not similar enough, the network fits the novel verb into the
most robust pattern of all—regularity’. Generalization to the regular pattern occurs with
every eligible stem, the hallmark o f a productive inflectional system.

4.2 Problems—
We should not be immediately convinced that we need to abandon rule-based,
dual-route approaches altogether. Pinker & Prince (1988, 1994) and Pinker (1999) bring
a number of criticisms to bear on connectionist models o f past tense such as R&M’s

’o f course, there are three sub-classes of regularity (/-d/, /-Id/, and /-t/), but decision between them can be
made on similarity o f the end “trigger’ feature. We have /-Id/ for stems ending [+dental, +cons], /-t/ for stems
ending [-voice, +cons], and /-d/ for stems ending [+voice, +cons or -t-vowel] (see also R&M, p. 247).
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Pinker’s main contention (1999) is that connectionist networks do fine at modeling
irregular past tense, but poorly at modeling regular, due to problems inherent in the
architecture of unconstrained connectionist systems in general. Pinker argues that
connectionist theorists have misinterpreted inconsistencies between modeling data and
child acquisition data to be indicative of shortcomings in modeling techniques (which has
fueled connectionist research for the past two decades). Pinker submits that
inconsistencies o f this nature should in fact tell us that single mechanism architecture is
//se//"insufficient to handle the child acquisition data.
What connectionists gain with non-modular architecture (a single mechanism
alternative), they lose in accuracy. The lack of a morphology module in the R&M model,
which only maps phonological representations o f the input onto phonological
representations in the output, causes considerable disanalogy with human language
processing. No information as to “structure of lexical entry,” “head o f word,” “root of
word,” “morphological category—N, V, Adjective,” “morphological structure,” “word =
stem + affix,” nor any lexical-semantic information, gets inputted into R&M’s inflectional
system. But kids and adults alike are sensitive to exactly this sort of information, to the
structure o f words, not just to the sounds words, when processing regular and irregular
inflections. Thus, the accuracy of the model stands to be questioned.
In a series of studies across a multitude of populations—college students, children
ranging from 3-10 years o f age—Kim et. al (1994) provide evidence that children’s
inflectional decisions have more to do with morphosyntactic concerns than with
phonology alone. Two of the experiments, one on 3-5 year olds and another on 6-8 year

42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

olds, aimed at teasing out children’s tacit morphological knowledge of “root,” “head,”
“noun,” “verb,” and “lexical entry.” The children in each study were given forced verb
choices like the following;
1.) This is a fly. Can you say ‘This is a fly?’ I’m going to fly this board.
{Put flie s all over the board)
I ju s t____ .
2a) This airplane is going to fly. Can you sa y ‘This airplane is going to fly?’ This
airplane is about to fly through the air.
{Have the airplane fly about)
The airplane ju s t
.
2b.) Mickey likes to drive really fast Look, Mickey is going to fly down the road.
Can you say ‘Mickey is going to fly down the road?’
{Have Mickey drive fa st down the road)
Mickey ju s t
.
Children 6-8 years o f age generalized the regular rule to questions like #1 (denominals)
66.7% o f the time, and children 3-5 64.1% of the time The 6-8 year olds regularized
questions like #2a (verb roots) only 11.1% of the time, whereas 3-5 year olds regularized
#2b (semantically extended verb roots) 46.6% of the time. Children 6-8 irregularized
questions like #1 17.6% of the time, and 3-5 year olds 5.6%. 6-8 year olds irregularized
questions like #2a 87.0% o f the time, and 3-5 year olds 22 .6% (for #2b).
So why don’t children cue on phonological similarity (as R&M’s network would)
and irregularize #1 more than they do (only -35% of the time)? There must be something
else that their inflectional system is attuned to. There are three options-morphology,
semantics, or both. MacWhinney & Leinbach (1991), with their updated model o f past
tense, encode basic semantic (as well as phonetic) features into the input units, and are
thus able to surmount problems that cripple older models (e.g. homonyms with different
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past tenses). Still, it is not certain that semantic information acts as input to the
inflectional system. If it did, the network would predict that verbs with similar meanings
take similar past tenses, which, for obvious reasons, is an unreliable and unnecessary
indicator o f past tense form (e.g. hit, slap, and strike are semantically related but all take
different past tenses—A/t, slapped, and struck'). Semantically related families of words do
not consistently undergo the same past tense change. The fact that children produce
different past tenses for hit, slap, and strike may reflect the need to index a specific lexical
item to decipher past tense (e.g. a specific stored past tense form, along with its lexical
features, e.g. N, V, or Adj.).
Lakoff (1987) would explain the fact that kids don’t irregularize #1 more often by
appealing to the semantic principle of “central sense,” that is, if a polysemous verb—
fly/fly (out)—hdi^ an irregular form, its central sense (the one kids more likely associate with
the verb—‘fly’ as in “birds fly”) will be irregular. The tendency, then, is to predict that if
the central sense is irregular, any non-central sense falls under the regular rule. “When a
verb is given an extended or metaphorical meaning, the new sense is felt to be dissimilar to
the original, and this inhibits the speaker from using the original’s irregular form” (Pinker,
1999: 151). Pinker nevertheless provides a number of counterexamples which indicate
that semantic extension per se has no bearing on a word’s past tense. For example, novel
words made by adding prefixes to irregulars almost always take the irregular, even though
the “sense” of the word may radically change. Instances are overeat-overate from eat-ate,
overshot, preshrank, remade, outsold, undid, and the list goes on. This effect occurs with
idioms as well, like “yZew off the handle,” not %/7W off the handle.”

44

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

If it’s not semantic information that children are cuing on when they choose flie d
for #1, what is it? Pinker (1999) argues that children exploit morphological cues in the
input to overcome the mapping problem with novel senses. What compels children to
choose flie d in Kim’s study (-65% o f the time) is implicit knowledge o f “root,” “head,”
“lexical entry,” and “morphological category.” Since the root offlie d is the noun ‘fly’ (as
in “the buzzing fly”), not the verb, the VP flie d must be headless, or “exocentric” (Kim et
al., 1994, 181). What would its head be? We’ve already established that it is a noun, not
a verb, so it must be ‘fly’ (N). But it can't be ‘fly’ (N), because then the properties o f ‘fly’
(N) would percolate up to the phrasal level, and flie d (to fly) would have to be a noun
phrase! Because flie d is headless, there is no possibility o f the irregular form heading this
phrase, percolating up its own properties, so no irregular properties ever get inputted into
the inflectional system, only properties of the noun ‘fly.’ Kids build flie d h y accessing ‘fly’
(N) from memory, and inputting it into their inflectional systems. They couldn’t possibly
be building “flied” from ‘fly’ (V), because ‘fly’ (V) is stored with its irregular past tense
form (flew), which would inevitably trigger the blocking mechanism, yet the regular rule
fo r “flie d " remains unblocked.
The inability o f R&M’s network to reliably predict the regularity offly in “fly the
board” is arguably a major setback for single mechanism theories. Whichever theory
accounts for the most data is the theory that should be advanced. Single-mechanism
theories o f past tense lack the appropriate lexical and morphological tools to account for
the fact that kids say flie d in “Mickey flied the board” (Put flies on the board).
MacWhinney and Leinbach (1991), it is argued, fail to make much headway. There is
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little evidence that children are predictingy7/e<i based on semantics alone. In fact,
semantics is an unreliable guide into the mapping problem, as counterexample after
counterexample leads kids astray. To be able to reliably predict flie d for #1, modelers
would have to build morphology layers into their networks, but once this is done, we have
a full-fledged modular system (albeit “modules,” or layers, of PDFs). A morphology layer
would partially satisfy Pinker, but not completely. Something appears to be wrong with
the mechanism itself.
R&M’s model stores the past tenses of regulars in memory; it memorizes regular
past tenses, even though there is no need to because regularization occurs by statistical
default. According to Pinker (1999), regular past tense forms are stored in the lexicon
only in root form (untagged). The two components of the linguistic system—grammar
(with its sub-components) and the lexicon—are inputted with an eligible stem in parallel.
The lexicon searches its database for a match, for the same or similar root clustered with
its irregular past tense form. If it finds a match, the rule is blocked by an innate blocking
mechanism. If not, the rule fires as a default. (See figure 4.) Stored past tense forms for
regulars would be superfluous. All we need is a stem to fill the default rule’s variable, and
this can be derived from roots stored in the lexicon (via the application o f “lexical rules”).
Thus, Pinker paints a much less structured, more economical portrait of memory than the
connectionists. No “regular pattern” exists in Pinker’s lexicon, as each case of regularity
is subsumed under the rule.
The fle\v-flied ambiguity in the Kim et. al. (1994) study is part of a larger problem
for R&M’s network. Pinker & Prince (1988, 1994) point out that the network cannot tell
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the difference between homonyms (break-broke, brake-braked, ring-rang, wring-wrung,
lie-lied, lie-lay), insofar as the network uses sound (and sound alone) to compute past
tense. Children, on the other hand, especially in stage 3, attune themselves to the
structure o f words during linguistic processing, that is, to the fact that a word can take a
stem plus an affix, that words have roots, and that words, like phrases, have heads. If
words were stored in a more coherent sense in the network (i.e. with semantic and/or
morphological representations), the homonym problem would be solved. Like kids, the
network would simply note that “braked,” for example, is exocentric, so all the properties
o f the irregular verb form would be blocked. Because “braked” is headless, there is no
pathway up which these irregular properties could percolate. Without “lexical entries” to
encode such morphological and semantic information—bridging the gap between sound
and meaning—R&M’s network cannot accurately model the acquisition of past tense.
A handful o f R&M’s predicted outputs for novel verbs, moreover, turn out to be
ugly, mangled blends of features (tour—>toureder, mail—>membled). Whenever novel
regular stems are fed to R&M’s network which contain features peripheral (or orthogonal)
to other regular patterns in memory, it blends whatever scraps of overlapping information
are applicable to form the novel past tense. But this is not true when it comes to people,
who, when encountering a novel stem with little to no similarity to acceptable words of
their language, routinely generalize the regular pattern (e.g. in the “ploamph” test; Prasada
& Pinker, 1993). Prasada & Pinker (1993) gave both humans and a replica o f R&M’s
network a past tense formation task for novel stems (e.g. “plip,” “glinth,” “smaig,”
“ploamph,” “smeerg”). Humans generalize the “-ed” suffix to all novel verbs (without
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similar sounding irregulars) regardless of similarity to other regular stems, in fact,
regardless of whether the novel stem is an acceptable English word. For example, “plip”
(a phonotactically acceptable word in English) was turned into “plipped” by humans at
nearly the same rate that “ploamph” (an phonotactically unacceptable in English) was
turned into “ploamphed.” The network, on the other hand, came up with bizarre blends
not found in the human data, like brilth—>prevailed, or even worse, smeej—>leefloag,
ploanth—>bro, smeeb~>imin. Moreover, it was not even able to produce the past tense
o f “ploamph” except on 10% of the trials (Pinker, 1999: 143),
/rregulars, of course, should be susceptible to the mail-membled error because
they are stored in the lexicon. Regulars, on the other hand, should not be affected by such
association because they are not stored in the lexicon (but “mail” is regular, so this would
be an obvious problem for R&M). Nevertheless, before we can claim that mail-membled
is a problem for R&M, we have to assume Pinker is right about regular storage (or the
lack thereof) in the first place. In R&M’s defense, it is not clear that children are immune
from such error (although adults probably are). Pinker and Pasada’s tests were based
primarily on adult performance, but when we look at past tense elicitations done on kids
(e.g. Kim et al., 1994), jumbled answers are occasionally given. In fact, Kim et al. reserve
a column in their data for “uncodable” responses, which, for 3-5 year olds in Experiment
#2, occur nearly 10% o f the time (191). Membled would be one such “uncodable”
response (though there would have to be a limit to stretching this, e.g. yield~>rilt, see
“Convergent Model” section).
At this point, only one of the problems mentioned really undermines R&M’s
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prefect—the homonym problem (e.g. hng—>rang, but wrmg~->wrwig\ fly —>flew, but
f ly —>flied when derived from a noun). A related problem is that Wickelphonology cannot
even represent the words o f some languages. The meanings associated with full
reduplications in reduplicating languages would be lost altogether, bringing into question
the cross-cultural accuracy of R&M’s model. Algal, in Australian Oykangand, means
‘more or less straight’ whereas algalgal means ‘perfectly straight’ (Sommer, 1980; Pinker
& Prince, 1988), but these words are indistinguishable according to Wickelfeatures alone.
Algal gets treated by the network as (#al, alg, Iga, gal, al#}, being further decomposed
into triplets o f Wickelfeatures, and algalgal gets treated as (#al, alg, Iga, gal, alg, Iga, gal,
al#), also being further decomposed. But there is no Wickelfeature that will be present in
the one set for algal while not in other for algalgal (the same nodes would fire for each).
Thus, there is no principled way for the network to detect it is dealing with two different
words with two different meanings, unless we build a MacWhinney and Leinbach (1991)
type widget into the model.
Finally, we come to the issue of “jiggery-pokery” (Pinker’s term )-the criticism
that R&M’s results are contrived, or “forced,” due to their manipulation of training data
and input units For one, R&M purposefully “blurred” the Wickelfeature representation
(the input) to enhance generalization (R&M, 1988: 238-9). “This is accomplished by
turning on, in addition to the 16 primary Wickelfeatures, a randomly selected subset o f the
similar Wickelfeatures, specifically, those having the same value for the central feature and
one o f the two context phonemes” (238). The result of turning on Wickelfeatures
superfluous to the task of representing the input is that “each word will activate a larger
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set o f Wickelfeatures, allowing what is learned about one sequence of phonemes to
generalize more readily to other similar but not identical sequences” (238). By sparking
Wickelfeatures o f other members o f a given class (pattern), the network gets a head start
at figuring out which weight setting is required to compute the right answer. The
superfluous Wickelfeatures are like “lead blockers.” They cause the network’s weight
settings to be in a state partially equivalent to the one needed to compute members of a
particular pattern (of which the novel verb is a candidate). Without “blurring,” the
network runs the risk o f becoming entrenched in idiosyncratic input features, in which case
generalization would slow to a creeping halt.
Secondly, R&M structured their input to facilitate u-shaped learning, but this is
arguably an instance of “jiggery-pokery” as well. In the first stage of training, the network
was fed 10 stem-past tense pairs, 2 of which were regular (20%). In stage 2, though,
R&M changed the regular-irregular ratio, and regulars constituted 80% o f the input. But
R&M’s training set is in many ways orthogonal to the input kids actually get exposed to
(Pinker & Prince, 1988, 1994; Pinker, 1999). The ratio of regulars to irregulars in the
actual data is no more than 50% throughout stage 2 (Brown, 1973; Slobin, 1971; Pinker
& Prince, 1988), a figure which would seriously impair the network’s ability to stumble
across the regular pattern*. After all, it is a probabilistic machine, and the strength of
patterns in memory (i.e. o f “types”) is relative to the input frequency of “token” members
o f the relevant class. In a 50-50 situation (50% regular, 50% irregular), we would most

This ratio is contradicted by Marchman & Bates (1994: 353-4), whose figure reads 55% regulars around age
2;3. Nevertheless, this is insuHicient for R&M’s simple recurrent network (SRN), though success can be met
with such an input distribution in newer models with hidden layers.
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likely wind up with close to 50-50 results (i.e. the regular “rule” would potentially forfeit
its regularity). Moreover, R&M abruptly increased the size of the training set (into phase
2 o f training) from 10 verbs (cycled 10 times) to 420 verbs (cycled 190 times), but this too
yields considerable divergence from the child acquisition data (Dromi, 1987; Bates et al.,
1992; Marchman & Bates, 1994), which speaks more of incremental learning. Both cases
o f “jiggery-pokery” addressed by Pinker (1999) appear to indicate that the model is
fundamentally inadequate.

4.3 Implications—
If we reject MacWhinney and Leinbach’s model, what remains is a model riddled
with holes. R&M’s model has no idea of “word structure.” Nevertheless, kids and adults
alike are sensitive to more than just the sounds of words. Kids and adults generalize the
regular rule to “denominal” (derived from a N) and “exocentric” (headless) verbs, for
example, indicating that sound alone falls short of adequate input for the inflectional
system (Kim et al., 1994; Pinker & Prince, 1988, 1994; Pinker 1999). Denominal verbs
like to fly out (to center field), to ring (the bottle), to spit (the pig), to high-stick (the
goalie) are routinely regularized by kids and adults (Kim et al., 1994; Pinker & Prince,
1988, 1994; Pinker, 1999). Few irregularization errors occur with denominal verbs,
despite the fact that many of these verbs are phonologically identical to irregulars (flyflew, ring-rang, spit-spat, stick-stuck). This is evidence that sound alone is an inadequate
predictor of past tense.
What blocks the irregular rule in cases of denominal verbs is the fact that they are
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linked to the noun form, but not to their verb forms. The verb form of “fly” is not the
head o f “to fly out” (in fact, it is a headless, or “exocentric” construction); rather, it is
derived from the NP “fly ball,” or more simply, from “fly” (as in “a pop fly”). Again, if
“fly” (as in “fly ball”) were the head, whose properties in the standard theory percolate up
to the phrasal level, then “to fly out” would have to be a noun phrase. Thus, “to fly out”
must be a headless VP. The fact that people are sensitive to these sorts of
morphosyntactic constraints—seldom producing “flew out” (to center field) even though
“flew out” (the window) allures them into the y-> ew change pattern—demonstrates that
people are, albeit unconsciously, applying notions like “head,” “root,” “lexical entry,” etc.
R&M’s model handles irregulars with good results; even Pinker sees the lexicon
as a sort o f pattern associator, inherently skilled at detecting, storing, and generating
patterns of features, generalizing over these patterns when novel stems are encountered.
R&M’s model is also good at explaining how irregularization errors are made (e.g.
squeeze-->squoze), as the stem-stem and change-change patterns grow stronger and
stronger into stage 3. It is argued, however, that R&M’s model fails to adequately explain
how (i) regulars are stored and processed, (ii) novel verbs are regularized, (iii)
regularization errors occur, and (iv) regulars appear to be immune to frequency effects
(the connectionist model predicts that the more a stem gets processed, regardless o f its
irregular/regular status, the quicker the discernment task will be).
R&M’s inadequate account of regular inflection necessitates (at least) a
reassessment of unified lexicalist claims to non-modularity, and perhaps even a
reassessment of the modeling potential of connectionist networks in general. Because the
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behavior o f R&M’s network is conditioned by frequency effects and regular-irregular
ratios in the input, yet regular-irregular ratios can be radically different across
individuals and cultures (Pinker, 1999: 234-5; also McCarthy & Prince, 1990; Omar,
1973), R&M’s model might offer little more than an anecdotal account o f past tense
formation. This, o f course, is a major blow to connectionist accounts, as they aim to
account for the general constraints during language acquisition, constraints which
determine the acquisition o f rule-like behavior across individuals.

5.0 The “Bottleneck” Model:
Plunkett and Marchman (1993) provide an alternative phonology-only model,
improving upon techniques used by R&M. By surveying the field of updated models
(Plunkett & Marchman, 1991, 1993; MacWhinney & Leinbach, 1991; Daugherty &
Seidenberg, 1994), we can be clear about which problems result from the nature o f
unconstrained connectionist systems, and which result from inadequate modeling
techniques. If we can demonstrate that the problems can be ironed out in newer networks,
then much of the criticism focused on the nature of these models will dissipate. Only then
can we be sure that we have a viable alternative to dual-route accounts.
Plunkett & Marchman (hereafter P&M) distinguish between macro and micro ushaped learning. In the traditional account o f u-shaped learning (Cazden, 1968; Ervin &
Miller, 1963), which R&M duplicate, the transition to stage 2 is marked by indiscriminate
overgeneralization of the regular suffix. P&M point out, though, that kids selectively
overgeneralize only to a particular subset of irregulars (even ones produced correctly in
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stage 1), either on the basis of stem-stem similarities with other regulars (e.g.
take—>taked), a lack o f sufficient stem-stem similarities with other /^regular patterns (e.g.
catch—>catched), or strictly on a “best-guess” basis for stems without any telling
likenesses (e.g. novel stems, ploamph—>ploamphed). Studies of naturalistic past tense
usage (Marcus et al., 1992) and psychological elicitation tests (Marchman, 1988;
Marchman & Plunkett, 1991) put the “regular rule imperialism” hypothesis to rest. These
studies indicate that more of a micro effect occurs in stage 2 (i.e. discriminate
overgeneralization).
Micro u-shaped learning o f past tense has been successfully implemented in
previous models (e.g. P&M, 1991), and this has been accomplished without any
discontinuities in the training data, that is, no abrupt changes in vocabulary size and no
skewed regular-irregular ratio. The results of this work suggest that the onset of
overgeneralization errors in stage 2 follows not from manipulation of the training set (as in
R&M’s model), but from competition between different change patterns in memory. The
fact that kids overgeneralize the “-ed” rule in stage 2 does not stem from dual-mechanism
architecture, in which the lexicon fa ils to retrieve the irregular and, in xnrn, fa ils to block
the rule; rather, overgeneralization stems from the fact that kids have a single mechanism,
and that different patterns in memory are competing for the use o f its connections.
P&M’s model can thus be labeled the “bottleneck model” (see figure 5).
P&M ’s project is to analyze the effects that incremental \Qaxrm% (Elman, 1991,
1999) can have on the network’s performance. In the wake of their 1991 work, P&M fed
their network a plausible training set, only this time around, instead of feeding stems one
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by one at a more or less constant rate, they increased the numbers of tokens (and thereby
types as well) incrementally. R&M’s training set went from 10 verbs to 420 verbs going
into stage 2. P&M’s model, on the other hand, goes from 20 to 80 to 100 to 140 to 200
to 260, on up to 500. Nor do P&M “blur” the input to enhance generalization. Thus,
P&M resist the temptation to “force” the sorts of effects linked to the transition to stage 2.
Instead, they allow the network to determine its own course of action.
The network does assume the micro u-shaped curve in the course of its learning,
and ultimately succeeds at mapping novel verbs correctly over 90% o f the time.
Qualitative changes in the network’s organization (stability of weight and threshold
settings), and its very ability to model the micro u-shape, follow from incremental
quantitative and structural changes in the verb vocabulary (changes in number of tokens
and distribution of types). Grammatical structure thus emerges in P&M’s network. The
domain-general processes of associative memory, in conjunction with a structured world
{incremental input), elicit qualitative changes in an entirely different domain (inflection,
linguistics).

5.1 Problems—
P&M skirt much of the difficulty arising from Wickelphonology. In their model,
an artificial language is used to represent English verbs^. “Each verb in the dictionary
consists o f a consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) string, a CCV string or a VCC string.

^This might seem dubious, but for one, the artificial language follows English phonotactic constraints, and two,
P&M’s results have been replicated in a number o f other networks with units that encode actual English words
(e.g. MacWhinney & Leinbach, 1991 ; Daugherty & Seidenberg, 1994).
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Each string is phonologically well-formed, even though it may not correspond to an actual
English word” (30). Each stem is further set equal to a particular change class. Only
those stems with the appropriate phonetic feature(s) are admitted into a particular change
class, paralleling constraints on actual English stems. For example, if a stem ends in a
[+cons, +dental] segment, it can either belong to the irregular “identity” (no change) class,
e.g. hit-hit, or to the regular /-Id/ suffix class, e.g. pit-pitted. P&M then set this CVC
stem (ending in a dental consonant) equal to one o f the two applicable classes, and are
therefore able to detect whether an error occurs in the output. Because P&M make the
added modification that each phoneme be encoded featurally (rather than clusters of three
as in R&M’s model), their network decomposes words much less arbitrarily—indeed,
much more realistically—iha.n R&M’s. P&M’s network appears to organize itself much
like Pinker (1999) suggests the lexicon organizes itself (i.e. according to “family
resemblance,” see Wittgenstein’s PI). Distributed representations of words overlap where
similar features are shared (e.g. “spring” and “sing” excite many of same nodes).
One of the few criticisms that P&M fall prey to is the homonym problem, but this
may not be a genuine concern. MacWhinney & Leinbach address the homonym problem
by encoding semantic features of the input. The counterargument is that semantics is an
unreliable predictor of past tense (Pinker 1999; Kim et al., 1994). But is it as reliable as it
needs to be? Let us assume that semantic extension gives us the right answer 50% of the
time, on par on Pinker’s prediction of chance. Now if kids are aware that the root of flied
in “fly the board” is the noun ‘fly,’ doesn’t this imply that they know flie d means
something different from fle w l Semantics may not be everything, but at least it accounts
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for some of the input. “Direct access” research (Cotrell & Plunkett, 1991), for instance,
demonstrates that people occasionally compute past tense directly from meaning, with no
recourse to the present tense form in memory. Could we at least, then, get the critics to
agree on 60% odds, just slightly above chance?
Let us assume that our arguments have thus far been convincing, and that it is
perfectly feasible that semantic extension could help us at least break chance odds. At this
point, we turn to the child acquisition data (Kim et al., 1994) to see whether our 60%
prediction is accurate. How often do kids regularize a verb with a non-central sense?
Only 64.1% o f the time (3-5 year olds. Experiment 2, p. 191), quite close to our 60%
prediction. Odds like these hardly make a social science, and this is true in either
direction. The merit of semantics as a solution to the homonym (and reduplication)
problem is largely underdetermined in both accounts. It is dubious, therefore, that such a
problem is indicative of anything more than inadequate modeling techniques.
There is one criticism, however, which P&M are clearly subject to. P&M set three
different output units equal to the 3 different regular suffixes (/-Id/, /-t/, & /-d/). If a novel
stem does not fit into one of the patterns in memory, it gets assigned to the most
probabilistic “sure bet”; after a certain degree of training, this would of course be the
regular pattern (at least in English!). Which regular suffix unit fires depends, of course, on
the stem-final feature (e.g. [+cons, +dental]—>/-Id/). Thus, the model appears to
distinguish (albeit from our perspective) between stems and affixes, some crude form o f
morphology emerging from the network’s behavior. It also at least appears to be applying
rules. Both “morphology” and “rules” emerge as by-products of the network’s
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subregularities, which themselves result from PDP association. The inclusion of suffix
units, however, is arguably a manipulation of connectionist architecture. It “forces”
affinity to the child regularization data. Regular endings are essentially “patched in,” and
regularization of a given stem frequently occurs because memory cannot fit it into an
irregular pattern.
The procedure goes as follows: when fed a novel stem, the network consults its
database for family resemblance to other irregular stem-past tense pairs as well as to
regulars (with regulars, the deciding factor is frequently their word-final feature); if an
irregular “closest match” is found, the novel stem falls into the relevant irregular change
class; if not, or if matched with a regular class based on similarities, the stem goes through
more or less unaltered, that is, until it is finally outputted, in which case the appropriate
regular suffix unit fires (i.e. no “blending” of features is necessary to manufacture most
regular past tenses). Note that this is a similar process described by Pinker (1999). In
Tinker’s account, if an irregular “closest match” is found in memory, it blocks the rule;
otherwise the rule fires as a default. Thus, P&M are able to model the default status of
the regular rule within the confines of a “single” mechanism, but at what cost?
P&M “patched in” these regular suffixes, and further, the distinction between stem
and affix. They set out to provide an alternative to dual-mechanism approaches, yet
ultimately commit themselves to dual architecture. If a separate group of units handle the
most crucial aspect of the regularization task (i.e. suffixation), and these units are not
directly involved in any correct irregular computation, then we can reasonably conclude
that we have two separate mechanisms. The regular unit “patch” is essentially a sub-
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mechanism of the larger neural net Because P&M “hard-wire” regular suffixes into their
network’s output units, the regular suffixation change is frequently not even gem ratedhy
the the mechanism that handles the irregulars (e.g. for “ploamph,” which has no
overlapping features with patterns in memory). In fact, regularization often depends on
the failure o f the network to find sufficient associations. Pinker (1999: 145) characterizes
all such attempts as “shameful,” and he might have a case here. P&M’s modeling
difficulties indicate the greater difficulty o f accurately modeling regular formation within
the confines o f a single mechanism. P&M make no progress toward a coherent account of
how regular past tenses are consistently computed (i.e. generated) by the same associative
net that computes irregulars. In the “ploamph” example, it is the lack o f successful
association that causes the appropriate regular unit to fire upon output. Thus, P&M make
no progress in explicating the lexical associative mechanisms out of which regular
inflectional grammar can be said to “emerge.”

6.0 The “Rules All the Way Down” Dual-Mechanism Model:
The seeds o f Pinker’s approach, which stands in opposition to single-mechanism
approaches, lie in more traditional dual-mechanism (“dual-route”) accounts Chomsky
and Halle (1968) subsume the lexicon under syntax, but clarify that lexical processes differ
characteristically from syntactic processes. “The syntactic component of grammar
contains a lexicon which lists lexical items and their inherent properties, in particular,
those phonological properties that are not determined by general rule” (44). The lexicon
is characterized as a list of formatives contained in a sub-module of syntax (e.g. boy, dog,
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and the associated concepts defining each*”), but only the idiosyncratic properties of these
formatives are encoded. Any regularities in the lexicon are “extracted” by the grammar
module, and subsumed under a particular set of rules.
Lexicon construction proceeds according to “lexical rules” which specify the way
formatives are to be encoded. For example, lexical rules establish that walk (/wak/) takes
the form “[v[ walk] pastjv” in the lexicon—subject to the regular past tense rule with a
non-exceptional “past” diacritic—as opposed to take (/tek/), which takes the form
“[v[ t*k]]v,” specifying irregular formation, or that the formative #tek# falls under some
particular vowel change rule in the phonology module. Really, though, walk does not
require a “past” tag at all. The very fact that it is not tagged for irregularity (as take is) is
sufficient for the system to determine that it falls under the regular “default” rule. In fact,
no regular past tenses can be found in Chomsky and Halle’s lexicon at all, only “untensed”
root forms, inertly waiting higher-level rules to build them up into full-fledged
morphosyntactic units (words, phrases, etc.).
Well-formedness rules specify the most minimal amount of structure required in
the lexicon to keep irregulars from being regularized, and to specify the appropriateness of
the regular rule elsewhere. Outside of lexical rules governing well-formedness (e.g. the
necessary inclusion o f the irregular past diacritic “*” and the unnecessary inclusion of
diacritics for regulars), the lexicon per se accounts for little of the structure of language.
10

Boy and dog would actually be represented in the lexicon in symbolic form, encoding the relevant phonetic
feature matrixes for each (see p. 9),
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It primarily consists of unrelated slots which get filled by representations for words. The
actual vowel change that turns /tek/ into /tuk/, for example, falls under phonological
rather than lexical rules, so the lexicon alone establishes only what vowel change needs to
occur, not how it occurs. Phonology takes the lexical representation as its input, and
assigns to it a phonetic description according to universal, and hence (putatively) innate
principles o f phonology.
In the take example, “readjustment rules” (10-11), presumably at the interface o f
the lexicon and phonology, tweak the lexical representation “[v[tek] pastjv” into
“[v[ t*k]]v,” flagging phonology to change the I d to an /u/. Once the take-took change
rule is acquired, that is, as error rates fall in the third stage of u-shaped learning, the
“[v[tek] pastjv” lexical entry gets overwritten by “[v[ t*kjjv,” providing more definitive
information for the phonology module, and thus promoting more accurate and efficient
processing of irregular past tense. Note, though, that Chomsky and Halle must assume
that a critical mass of past experience with the irregular took must be reached before the
generalization can be made that it gets the lexical diacritic

In part, then, the rules for

storing and forming irregulars do require learning, rather than being strictly “acquired,”
and such learning must draw from general learning mechanisms (pattern associators)
which make generalizations over data in memory.
The conclusion that acquiring the past tense took involves general learning
mechanisms might seem controversial to critics of generative phonology, but Chomsky
and Halle make it clear that their theory accommodates this fact. The grammar module in
its entirety is linked to short and long-term memory (10), otherwise known as a 2-stage
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memory. Short-term memory operates in real-time, so it stores the input sequence for
grammar mechanisms to access in the production of surface structures. Syntactic and
phonological surface-structure representations of input sequences depend on short-term
memory, whereas syntactic, phonological, lexical, and especially semantic d-structure
representations draw from long-term databases. What makes the grammar module so
efficient in its productive, rule-driven task is the fact that it need not be cluttered by
idiosyncratic information (the lexicon handles this) nor by any information other than the
rules themselves (general memory handles this). In the grammar module, rules “rule.”
Insofar as the lexicon provides only minimal information about the phonological
forms that a given stem can partake in (e.g. “telegraph,” “telegraphic,” and “telegraphy”),
individual entries are stripped of unnecessary morphological and phonological baggage. In
Chomsky & Halle’s lexicon (1968), the phonetic variations o f ‘telegraph,’ as in
“telegraph,” “telegraphic,” and “telegraphy,” do not get separate entries. Only one entry
(+tele+græf+) gets listed (encoded in a featural matrix), and the alternate phonetic
representations /téligræf/, /tclagræf/, and /tolégrif/ are generated by
morphological and phonological rules in separate modules. For example, assigning
appropriate stress contours to the alternatives is not the business of the lexicon, but that of
phonology (11-12).
With grammar being subserved by syntax and other highly rule-governed submodules, and the lexicon containing only minimal information, the source of linguistic
structure on Chomsky and Halle’s view is clearly grammar proper. Chomsky and Halle
present a fully modularized, serial symbol processor account of language processing par
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excellence. Syntax, along with its sub-modules—phonology, morphology, and the
lexicon—generate multi-level structural descriptions of input sequences (morphological &
lexical at the word level, syntactic at the phrasal & sentence level, and phonological at
both), by assigning to the sequences both a surface structure and a deep-structure. These
descriptions—represented by multi-level phrase-structure trees—are then fed to a semantics
module and assigned a semantic representation. Thus, speaker-to-hearer language
processing arrives at the end of its cycle, from the input, sound, to its output, meaning
(see figure 6). Because the rules for generating structural descriptions of input sequences
exploit variables (i.e. any eligible stem falls under the regular phonological change rule), in
other words, because grammatical processes are productive, an infinite number o f possible
sound-meaning correspondences can be generated by Chomsky and Halle’s system.
The acquisition of specific grammatical operations like past tense can be
explicated, according to Chomsky and Halle, by pinpointing those productive rules which
govern regulars and irregulars. On this view, both regulars and irregulars are subject to
phonological rules. Most every change-change pattern in the lexicon (e.g. the o—>e
change pattern in flow-flew, blow-blew, grow-grew) can be collapsed into a small handful
o f austere rules which specify particular feature changes to a given irregular stem. Take
for example the rise-rose and take-took changes.
I f we take the present tense form as the underlying form, we must assign the
lexical representations / r i z / , /tæ k /, respectively, which give [ ra y z ], [ të y k ] in
the usual way. To derive the past tense forms, we first apply a rule shifting
backness and rounding, which is widely applicable to irregular verbs and other
irregular forms...This gives [rü z ], [tok]. Diphthongization and Vowel Shift give
[rowz], [tôw k]. Finally, reapplication of the Vowel Shift rule gives the forms
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[rôwz], [tûwk], (202)
Only two rules, one being applied recursively, are needed to account for the rise-rose and
take-took change. In this case, the diacritic

in the lexical entries “[v[ r*z]]v” and

“[v[t*k]]v” not only signifies which phonological laws the stem falls under in past tense
formation, but further that the stem requires two cycles of the Vowel Shift rule.

6.1 Problems—
Cling-clung, tell-told, biïid-bomid, break-broke changes all follow an instance of
the Vowel Shift rule [-back]—>[+back, +round], as well as rwi-ran and hold-held
([+back]—>[-back, -round]). Eat-ate, choose-chose, sing-sang, sit-sat changes all fall
under the Lowering Ablaut rule ([+high]—>[-high]), bear-bore follows a Backing Ablaut
rule (mid front vowel —> mid back vowel), and flee-jled, shoot-shot fall under the
Shortening Ablaut rule (long vowel —> short). In total, nearly 165 irregular verbs are
generated by only 3 phonological rules (Pinker, 1999: 92). The economy of the “rules all
the way down” model is striking, but it comes at a price.
Chomsky and Halle discount the even more traditional view that all irregulars are
learned bottom-up (rote). Chomsky and Halle see verbs sitting on a continuum from
completely regular on one extreme (walk-walked) to completely irregular on the other (gowent, be-was). Irregulars formed by suppletion (go-went) are memorized outright by
general cognitive mechanisms, then stored in the lexicon as “[v[went] past]v”; fully regular
verbs are generated by general rule, regular past tense forms not being stored in the
lexicon; and verbs “less” irregular than go-went are generated by more specific rules (as
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with the ing-ang-ung change-change family), being stored in the lexicon with the
appropriate irregular change tag (e.g. “*”)
Chomsky and Halle’s characterization of the non-suppleted irregulars (in other
words, most irregulars) is nevertheless doubly problematic. First, the Vowel Shift rule,
and its sub-rules, Lowering, Backing, and Shortening Ablaut, all follow from a troubled
assumption, that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” (Pinker, 1999) in the minds of
modern day speakers. Take for example the flee-jled change. Chomsky and Halle handle
this example with the Shortening Ablaut rule, which specifies where “[v[fl*]]v” occurs in
the lexicon, make the change [+long]—>[-long]. Enter the troubled assumption. The ee
sound in “flee” is wof just a drawn out, longer version of the e sound in “fled.” These are
qualitatively different vowels, /i/ being high and tense (plus a /y/ sound usually follows,
creating a diphthong—/fliyd/), and /e / being mid and lax. “Long” vowel and “short” vowel
“have been misnomers in English at least since the Great Vowel Shift in the fifteenth
century, when people scrambled the pronunciation of vowels” (Pinker, 1999: 95). As
people “scrambled” vocalic pronunciations more and more over time, the less and less
applicable became rules for manipulating specific qualities of vowels.
Chomsky and Halle argue that d-structures must be stored in our lexicons—
otherwise we run into the problem of M>hich s-structure to store (see “telegraph” example).
The Vowel Shift rule applies because the d-structure for a stem like flee in modern brains
is more or less identical to the d-structure in Chaucer’s brain! “According to the
Chomsky-Halle theory, the mental representations o f words in different centuries over the
past millennium, and in all modern dialects, are the same; English has changed primarily by
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adding phonological rules” (Pinker, 1999: 98). Because we have d-structures stored in
our lexicons, vocalic pronunciations from before the Great Vowel Shift are preserved, so
the Vowel Shift rule still applies as it did 600 years ago. But unless Chomsky and Halle
can produce convincing evidence that kids in modern times are routinely exposed to the
Middle English pronunciations o f irregulars (which is altogether unfounded), Chomsky
and Halle must claim that the construction o f d-structure is informed by innate knowledge
o f vowel qualities from before the Great Vowel Shift (which is equally untenable—
evolution at an unprecedented rate).
The second problem with Chomsky and Halle’s model is that it cannot account for
the irregular data. Irregulars are inundated with stem-stem and change-change similarities,
or patterns: blow-blew, grow-grew, know-hiew, throw-threw; bind-bound, fwd-found,
grind-ground, wind-wound; drink-drank, shrink-shrank, sink-sank, stink-stank; bearbore, swear-swore, tear-tore, wear-wore. Moreover, these patterns seem to be productive
in some sense (at least semi-productive). Dive found itself resisting its regularity in the
early part of this century, and ultimately fell into the i—>o change pattern on analogy with
drive-drove, now the proper past tenses are “dived” (unusual in the U.S.) a W “dove” (the
usual version). Caught, cost, flung, knelt, quit, slung, stuck, and strung were all lured by
irregular patterns within the last few centuries (Jespersen, 1942). Diachronic shifts such
as these suggest that the lexicon is more like a pattern associator than a list o f unrelated
slots.
Kids and adults alike inevitably make irregularization errors {squeeze-squoze on
analogy with freeze-froze, bite-bote, bring-brang, trick-truck, see Xu & Pinker, 1992; also
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Pinker, 1999). Given nonsense stems with stem-stem similarities to genuine irregulars like
spling, people are easily seduced by the irregular ing-ang-ung family and produce splang
as a past tense (Bybee and Moder, 1983)‘V Evidently, then, the lexicon is not just an
inert, idiosyncratic “list” of items, but a mechanism hungry for patterns, one that literally
generates these patterns by detecting regularities in the input. The lexicon must thus
account for more o f the structure in past tense formation than traditionally thought.
Lexical structure o f this nature cannot be “distilled out” in the form of rules. “No rule can
cleanly pick out the i—>u verbs, which is why Chomsky, Halle, [and Mohanan] didn’t
bother looking for conditions that triggered each rule but resorted to listing the verbs
individually” (Pinker, 1999; 102-3). Following the advice of Bybee & Slobin (1982),
Pinker therefore settles on fam ily resemblance categories for irregular clusters, as rigid
rules are not flexible enough to accommodate irregular changes (e.g. sling—>slung though
spring—>sprang).
Chomsky and Halle’s model predicts not a drop of systematicity for lexical
processes (i.e. that lexical association of a stem with patterns in memory might “seduce”
that stem into a particular change class). Generalization o f a particular change rule is not
handled by the lexicon in Chomsky and Halle’s account, but by the grammar module.
Nevertheless, it is dubious that novel irregulars are generated by a general rule. A general
rule o f this nature (part o f competence proper) would be too rigid for irregular change
'^Experiments like Bybee & Moder’s suggest that these errors are not just performance errors, but a result of
competence, as they are “teased out” of the participants. Chomsky would clearly include the KOL kids bring to
these experiments in the domain of competence, but would qualify that splang is generated by rule (at least in
the 1968 literature). Only exceptionless rules fit into the domain of competence proper (see also Givon, 1999).
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class discriminations (errors o f commission would occur, e.g. “bring” would be incorrectly
admitted to the ing-ang family). If Chomsky and Halle included general conditions
designating when and only when a specific change should occur for a particular irregular
cluster, they could rightly say that generalization is what causes novel irregular structures.
But because they list these conditions for each verb individually, they forfeit the model’s
ability to generalize to novel irregulars (i.e. to “stereotype”). Thus, contrary to Chomsky
and Halle’s account, irregulars are best described as being learned bottom-up (on
analogy—by association—or by rote memorization, see Pinker, 1999; also Aronoff, 1975),
due to the fact that rigidly designated rules cannot account for irregular family
membership.
Moreover, it is not even clear that the lexicon stores word-rule associations at all
when it comes to irregular verbs. “Bybee & Slobin (1982) point out that speech errors
occurring when irregular past tenses are elicited are virtually always existing but incorrect
English words (e.g. rise-raise), never novel rule products (e.g. rise-rewsey (Pinker &
Prince, 1988: 333). These results demonstrate the lexicon’s prowess at storing wordword associations (hence “raise” for the past tense of “rise”), but demonstrate no such
ability when it comes to word-rule associations. Chomsky and Halle can thus account for
the regulars, and for regularization errors, that is, until kids have enough experience under
their belts, the lexical entry for “take” remains “[v[ take] pastjv” (no diacritic), so it falls
under the general rule; but they fall short of an adequate account of irregular verbs and
irregularization errors. Chomsky and Halle cannot adequately account for (i) the way in
which irregulars are formed (due to the first problem with d-structure), (ii) stem-stem and
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change-change patterns in the lexicon (due to the second problem, their characterization
o f the lexicon), and (iii) irregularization errors (due again to the second problem).

7.0 A Convergent Perspective;
The only way to get a clear grasp on how the lexicon and grammar interact and are
implemented in the brain is to study specific grammatical operations, paying close
attention to the sorts o f processing each seems to demand. Rumelhart and McClelland
(1986) and Plunkett and Marchman (1991, 1993) claim that irregular and regular past
tense verbs can each be handled by the same mechanism, that is, by the same neural
processor (a pattern associator memory, or PDP). On the other side of the debate. Pinker
(1999) argues that the lexicon and grammar (and at a finer grain of detail, “words and
rules”) are mediated by different sorts of neural processors, concentrating specifically on
the inflectional system (morphology module). Most of Pinker’s data specifically targets
the English past tense and nominative plural systems, but studies have been replicated in a
variety o f other languages (e.g. Arabic and German; Pinker, 1999: 211-239).
On the surface, English irregular verbs appear to be a grab-bag bunch whose rules
for past tense formation are fossils from before the Great Vowel Shift (“strong” verbs), or
whose rules have been corrupted over time (e.g. burned—>burnt, dived—>dove). But
when we look closer, there is a significant amount of structure in the lexicon which has
traditionally been neglected. Rules for forming the past tense of strong verbs before the
Great Vowel Shift appear as “artifacts,” or patterns in the lexicons of modern day
speakers resulting from stem-stem and change-change similarity between strong verbs that
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have held strong, as it were, to the test of time. Before the Great Vowel Shift, English
speakers produced the past tense of strong verbs by rule (ablaut), top-down, whereas
during and after the Shift, the phonological rules for past tense formation became
increasingly more inapplicable, so past tense forms for these verbs needed to be learned
more and more bottom-up (i.e. memorized rote or via association, not generated by rule).
Most strong verb past tense forms find their way into the modem day speakers’ lexicons in
a more or less bottom-up fashion.
When it comes to irregular past tense verbs, the degree of structure they exhibit
paints a less traditional portrait o f the lexicon. Stem-stem and change-change similarities
between irregulars form basic structures (or patterns) in the lexicon, and these patterns
seem to have some rule-like qualities, as in the dived/dove example. For many modern
day speakers (whose dialect seldom puts “dived” to use), the production o f the past tense
“dived” is blocked because “dove” has been memorized and is clustered in the lexicon with
other verb forms of similar patterns. For speakers of dialects including both uses, “dove”
is either generated by phonological rule (which is unlikely, see previous section) or on
analogy with verbs in the i—>o change pattern. The latter phenomenon falls out quite
naturally from the model, so long as we consider the lexicon as a type o f pattern
associator.
Because efficient pattern recognition is a characteristic shortcoming of rule-driven
serial symbol processors (Bechtel, 1988), it is an unlikely candidate for English irregular
verbs. “It has not been easy to develop rule-based processing systems with good pattern
recognition abilities, in part because such recognition requires the machine to be able to
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deal with an enormous number of contextual clues, whose relevance may differ from
context to context” (Bechtel, 1988: 262). Because the categorization of a novel irregular
stem depends on recognition of an appropriate change pattern (based on contextual cues),
a serial symbol processor would not be an efficient mechanism for irregulars. A rule-based
serial symbol processor operates according to necessary and sufficient conditions for
category membership, what Givon (1999) calls “Platonic categories.” A serial symbol
processor would thus have considerable trouble handling the fiizzy categorical status of
irregular “families,” or clusters. Thus, departing from Chomsky and Halle’s (1968) view
that irregular formation boils down to a few stripped-down, austere rules. Pinker suggests
that it is handled by a type o f pattern associator memory, or parallel distributed processor.
When we look at regular past tense formation, on the other hand, it appears to be
a highly rule-governed process, and less constrained connectionist networks model it
inaccurately. Egedi and Sproat (1991) beefed up (not “beff up”) the connectionist model
o f past tense, ridding it of problematic Wickelphonology (as do Plunkett&Marchman,
1993; MacWhinney & Leinbach, 1991; and Daugherty and Seidenberg, 1994). They
added a hidden-layer for more complex computational abilities (“internal
representations”^^), and a training set based on acceptable ratios and numbers of regular
and irregular verbs. Unlike P&M, Egedi & Sproat did not hard-wire, or “patch in,” the
regular suffix, so the same nodes and connections mediated both regular and irregular

hidden layer of units enables networks to construct internal representations, usually using different
groupings of features than input representations. Because it provides additional and slightly different featural
representations, the network has more raw data to work with (i.e. to associate). Thus, with a hidden layer, the
likelihood increases that if there are regularities to be exploited, they will be detected and recorded by the
network. Units in the hidden layer are connected only to input and/or output units, and thus receive no external
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inflections. The network generalized change patterns to irregular stems as effectively as
humans, but failed miserably at the regulars, leading the researchers (and Pinker, 1999) to
conclude that different sorts of processors are required for regulars and irregulars. Egedi
and Sproat’s network (i) assigned to regular stems the “zero” suffix when a change should
have been made, (ii) confused regular input stems with other regulars {train—>trailed,
speak—>smoked, glow—>glanced, conflict—>conflated), and (iii) about 25% of the time,
produced unpredictable, almost unimaginable errors like wink—>wok, yield—>rilt,
satisfy—>sedderded, and quiver—>qness (145). The network simply misrepresents the
way regular verbs are computed. Regular inflections result from suffixation, not from
“blending” features associatively.
Pinker (1999) interprets the network’s inadequacy with respect to regular verbs to
be indicative that the connectionist model itself is incomplete. In the symbol processing
account, the regular rule, as a default, exploits variables to predict the proper past tense.
Any stem is eligible for the rule once it gets inputted into the rule box (even the stem
‘input,’ whose root form takes the irregular), which is precisely why the past tense of
“take,” for example, occasionally comes out “tooked” in child speech error data (Brown,
1973). The “rule box” is more or less unaffected by which stem it gets fed—precisely why
the input “took” does not block the rule in producing “tooked.” The regular rule does not
discriminate; it fires ballistically (all or nothing). Because symbol processors exploit
variables in just such a fashion, and because rules in symbol processors designate ballistic.

stimuli.
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serial operations (X—>Y/_), rules appear to be implemented in very different neural
hardware than words. Regulars are thus generated top-down (generated by rule), from a
symbol processor that takes eligible stems as input and serially copies them (with the
appropriate phonological alterations), then adds “-ed” (/-Id/, /-t/, or /-d/). Irregulars, on
the other hand, are handled by a pattern associator, learned and generated from memory in
a more or less bottom-up fashion. What makes Pinker’s model so efficient is that his
lexicon is uncluttered by regular past tense forms, saving much needed time when the
database is searched for a match.
The procedure for formulating past tense in Pinker’s account goes as follows: a
verb stem is inputted in parallel to the two main components of the inflectional system (the
lexicon and grammar); the lexicon, a sort of associative memory, scans its database for
similar stems which fall into a given change pattern; if a “closest match” is found, the stem
gets generalized to that class, and the output of the rule mechanism, a serial symbol
processor, is blocked—an irregular past tense form is outputted; if no similarities are found
during the search, the regular rule fires. Thus, past tense forms for regulars need not be
stored. Indeed, it is precisely the absence of regular stem forms in memory that triggers
the application of the default rule. (See figure 4.)
Because generative rules of grammar are too rigid (exceptionless) for the
irregulars, yet a system devoid of rules (or further constraints) cannot adequately account
for the regulars, a hybrid position between Chomsky & Halle’s and Rumelhart &
McClelland’s seems to be in store when it comes to past tense formation. Regular past
tense formation is best described as being mediated by a serial processor, which uses top-
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down information (representations, “word=stem+affix” templates, “blocking” mechanisms
etc.

whereas irregular past tense formation is best described as being mediated by a

parallel distributed processor, using primarily bottom-up processes, with no explicit rules
or pre-set weights, although connections can be altered, or strengthened, when a verb is
adopted into a particular pattern. In other words, irregulars are memorized rote, and
regulars are generated by rule. At the psychological level, a hybrid view makes sense
because it does not entail what Pinker calls “jiggery-pokery,” or “fudging,” in trying to
model child past tense learning accurately.

7.1 Problems—
Pinker's model predicts frequency effects for the irregulars, but not for regulars.
Subjects in one experiment, for example, produced infrequent irregulars much more slowly
than frequent ones, but the same result failed to hold for regulars (Pinker, 1999: 129).
Since regular past tenses are not stored, there would be no delay in applying the rule due
to tenuous memory traces. Daugherty and Seidenberg (1994), however, demonstrate that
frequency actually can affect a certain class of regular verbs, which they label the “regular
but inconsistent” class. Verbs like hake-baked that have close irregular neighbors in
phonological space (e.g. take-took) are, in fact, sensitive to frequency. Pinker (1999)

’^These need not be representatiom lly innate to the extent Elman ( 1999) suggests. Take, for example, the
blocking mechanism, which can be explained with recourse to local and global architectural constraints (less
direct), or with recourse to functional pressures on developing brains for both rapid and attended processing
(for rules and words, respectively).

74

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

stipulates that bake-baked is “attracted” by stem-stem similarities into the /e/—>/u/ change
class, and thereby stored in the lexicon. Doublet past tenses must be stored as well,
otherwise it would be impossible to produce both forms; for example, the past tense form
dreamt would always block the production of dreamed. So now we have all doublets
{slit/slitted, dreamed/dreamt) plus all “regular but inconsistent” past tense forms in the
lexicon. The problem becomes clear when we sit down and list all the words that this
would include.
Slit/slitted, rid/ridded, dreamed/dreamt, dived/dove, braked (broke), baked (took),
blinked (drank), pitted (hit), flitted (hit), shit/shat/shitted, lied (lay), squeezed (froze),
sneezed (froze), fa ked (broke), ached (broke), caked (broke), showed (grew), bowed
(grew), mowed (grew), towed (grew), flow ed (grew), dinged (brang), pinged (brang),
winged (brang), flaked (took), bared (bore), cared (bore), shared (bore), paired (bore),
pared (bore), fa red (bore), pined (found), wined (found), dined (found), minded (found),
and the list goes on, must all be stored. Furthermore, any time a novel verb is encountered
that is phonologically similar to an irregular stem-stem similarity class, it too is stored.
This paints a much different picture o f the lexicon, one shot through with exceptional
regular past tenses. The sheer bulk of intermediary cases indicates that our “regular”
classification cannot be as rigid as Pinker makes it out to be. Yet rigid classification of
regulars is precisely what a serial symbol processor demands for efficient computation (i.e.
“Platonic categories”). Daugherty and Seidenberg (hereafter D&S) see this as an
indication that we need to abandon the “rules and exceptions” approach to grammar,
exemplified by Pinker (1999) for the regular past tense. They instead adopt a “continuum
75
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o f regularity” view. Unlike Chomsky & Halle’s “continuum of regularity,” however,
D&S’s is not rule-governed in the tradional sense. More of a “prototypical” rule seems to
be in order for the regulars, rather than an exceptionless rule of grammar (see Givon,
1999; also Rosch, 1975). The most regular set of regulars (those without similar-sounding
irregulars) would be clustered closest to the mean (e.g. talk-talked), and the “regular but
inconsistents” would define the next circle out (e.g. bake-baked), and so on until we get to
the least frequent “regular but inconsistent” verb, the one that takes the longest to
produce.
According to D&S, Pinker’s solution to the “regular but inconsistent” problem is
a d hoc. “Note that there is no independent basis for assuming that the ‘associative net’
will necessarily exhibit this property [the attraction of “regular but inconsistents”]; it is
merely stipulated as a means for handling some novel behavioral facts” (D&S, 1994: 382).
In the dual-route theory, there is no basis for distinguishing “pure” regulars from “regular
but inconsistent” types. The efficacy of Tinker’s blocking mecanism (and lexical look-up)
appears to be in jeopardy. Pinker cannot explain how squoze is frequently produced
without admitting that his model suffers inherent mechanical shortcomings (i.e. false-alarm
blocking). Moreover, he cannot account for frequency effects on “regular but
inconsistents” without claiming that all such past tenses (and doublets) are stored in the
lexicon—a move which seems to fly in the face of his own lexical storage criterion (i.e.
//regularity).
In connectionist models, however, the “regular but inconsistent” phenomenon falls
out naturally because the same weights are being used to compute both irregulars and
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regulars. Because Pinker cannot account for such a large class o f regular verbs (without
recourse to a d hoc stipulation), it is questionable that connectionist accounts are parasitic
o f symbolic accounts, as he claims elsewhere on similar grounds (Pinker & Prince, 1988).
In point o f fact, it might be the case that the relation holds the other way around. At least
part o f Pinker’s project needs to be devoted to explicating the lower-level mechanisms
that ground his higher-level theory of language cognition (see “Discussion” section).
Another problem Pinker inevitably faces is that o f vagueness. Throughout his
writings (Pinker&Prince, 1988, 1994; Pinker, 1989, 1994, 1999), Pinker suggests that a
variety o f past tense phenomena are consequences o f innate architecture. He alludes to
many such innate mechanisms—“word=stem+affix” templates, templates specifying lexical
categories (N, V, Adj.), and the blocking mechanism—but his account of how these are
innate (i.e. type o f innateness) is lacking (see Elman, 1999), nor does he explain how these
so-called “templates” are implemented. Elman himself appears to have trouble pinning
Pinker down—though he eventually categorizes him as a representational nativist (1999;
3). Even where Pinker refers to “representations” (e.g. “word=stem+afFix” templates,
blocking principles), he fails to explain how they got there. He does appeal to natural
selection (e.g. Pinker, 1994), but natural selection per se is blind to distinctions between
direct and indirect genetic encoding, only ensuring that a given behavior gets replicated,
not specifically how or to what extent genes code for it. The quote Elman cites as
evidence that Pinker is a representationalist (from Pinker, 1994: 93, 97) contains vague
talk o f “instinct,” a “certain wiring of microcircuitry,” but it does not clarify to what extent
genes have a role in ensuring this “wiring.” Pinker is working at such a high level of
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description, it is unclear whether he has a specific neurological framework in mind; in turn,
he fails to provide a coherent neural-level interpretation of his theory. Pinker sufficiently
understates the lower-level implications of his theory to ward off any stereotypes, but this
is an obvious problem for those outside the field of psychology, who want an empirically
grounded account o f innate constraints they can “sink their teeth into.”
Pinker’s account o f past tense is beneficial, though, in exposing “tricks” used by
modelers, making explicit the requirements for an adequate model of past tense. It does
seem that kids and adults alike cue on more than just sound when determining past tense.
Further, there is marked evidence that children cue on the structure of words, not only on
sound (and semantics). Moreover, most regulars do appear to be immune to frequency
effects, which might mean they follow a rule with variables, the hallmark of a symbol
processor; that is, because any stem is acceptable, the rule does not hesitate, even for the
most infrequently used verbs. Connectionist accounts have thus far failed to explicate
various higher level phenomena (e.g. the fact that kids say “flied” in Kim’s test as often as
they do). At the psychological level, a description of how children come to form past
tense in connectiotiist terms is inadequate. Children simply do not appear to process
regular past tense the way Rumelhart and McClelland’s model does.
(See figure 7 for a summary of the phenomena to be explained for past tense and
how each model handles the explanation.)

8.0 Discussion:
Although Pinker, Prince, Kim, Egedi and Sproat all work to establish the need for
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a modular system at the functional (psychological, cognitive) level, we do not have to rule
out the possibility that at the neural (or implementational) level, the processor used for
regulars might in fact be a PDP. Pinker himself fails to adequately explain how his higherlevel theory can be applied at the lower level, yet connectionism accomplishes just such a
task (i.e. mediation, see Smolensky, 1986). Akin to P&M’s “patching in” of regular units,
we would have to include a highly constrained PDP, but it is indeed possible to have
“modules” ofPD Ps (i.e. multi-layered processing). PDP modeling is by no means
synonymous with, or committed to, single-mechanism hypotheses (nor is it committed to
entirely open-ended, unconstrained computation). For our purposes, one module, a less
constrained PDP, would handle the irregulars, which would be stored both in stem and
past tense form. A sub-module, a highly constrained PDP, would be inputted with the
relevant verb-stem in parallel, and would be dedicated to processing regulars. If the less
constrained PDP cannot find an irregular match, the highly constrained PDP’s prediction
shines through; if it can find a match, the constrained PDPs output portals are blocked (a
la Pinker's blocking mechanism*'*). The regular suffix would thus be assigned as a default,
so no regular past tense forms would need to be stored. We could also build semantic and
morphological units (or layers) into the model.
Such a model would account for the lack of frequency effects on most regulars, yet
reserve the possibility that frequency might affect “regular but inconsistent” verbs. The

*'*Actually, this is not exactly ‘Tinker’s” blocking mechanism. His version comprises part of a domain-specific
system, but the system described here is inherently domain-general (although it may specialize in languagerelated computations). Functional pressures for both rapid and attended processing in general (see Givon,
1999) could easily account for modularization effects that occur in one’s lifetime (see B&G, p. 64). Or it might
be the case that the blocking mechanism is in fact innate; still, we can account for this fact with recourse to less
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theory predicts a critical window of time during which an appropriate irregular pattern can
be located, after which the rule inevitably gets applied (e.g. for “ploamph,” after a certain
time spent unsuccessfully searching for an irregular match, the system’s default would
apply). Because regular but inconsistents share phonologically similar featural sets with
irregulars (stem-stem), it would take longer for the lexicon to determine whether there is
sufficient featural overlap to warrant blocking the rule. The lexicon, a type of pattern
associator, “attracts” regular but inconsistents into irregular patterns. Our options are as
follows: one, either stipulate this feature of our model (i.e. the attraction and subsequent
delay with regular but inconsistents due to lexical association), and further, accept the
inevitability o f dual architecture in accounting for the data, or two, be completely ignorant
o f the facts o f past tense inflection—that we attune ourselves to the structure of words as
well as to sound, that regulars are flat botched by Egedi & Sproat’s network, that regulars
would be mental “baggage” if stored like irregulars, that most regulars are immune to
frequency effects, and so on.
Pinker can get away with stipulation for regular but inconsistents because he views
the lexicon as a type of associative net, inherently generating patterns, attracting candidate
stems to applicable classes. “The words-and-rules theory predicts only that people don’t
depend on stored [regular] past-tense forms, not that they are incapable of storing them”
(Pinker, 1999: 137). If a regular past tense stem has too much featural overlap, it must be
stored, otherwise it would cause the inflectional system considerable “noise” each time it

direct genetic inscription (e.g. local and/or global architectural constraints, see Elman, 1999).
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gets inputted. The promptness of the rule’s firing, moreover, is contingent upon the
promptness of the lexicon’s decision procedure. During and after stage 3, verbs like bake,
for example, would cause less delay than rarer verbs like pare, due to the fact that the
memory trace to bake's featural representation would be much stronger. The more
frequently a regular but inconsistent verb is processed, the less delay the lexicon has in
fitting it into an appropriate pattern. Regulars that are not inconsistent would be
computed without excess delay (i.e. just the amount of time it takes for the irregular
processor to realize there is no match). Conversely, then, another prediction is that the
more overlapping features a regular but inconsistent stem has with irregular patterns in
memory, the longer it will take to compute its past tense (up to a certain “critical” point,
when the default operation fires). These predictions, based on a positive correlation
between frequency and processing speed, have been confirmed in experiments on
“parallel-race” theory (Baayen & Schrender, 1995; Baayen, Dijkstra, and Schrender,
1997).
There is further evidence for a dual-mechanism from a neurolinguistic perspective
Rhee, Ullman, and Pinker (1999) used MEG (Magnetoencephalographic) technology to
chart the neural regions that “light up” when past tense is formed in non-impaired brains.
About a quarter of a second after the initial stimulus (an English verb stem), left temporal
and parietal regions light up for both regulars and irregulars alike. About a tenth o f a
second later, left frontal regions light up, but only when the stimulus is a regular stem.
These results are compatible with the dual-mechanism account. For both regular and
irregular stems, the lexicon is scanned for a match (the process shown by the first recorded
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pattern o f neural activity); if a match is found, the rule is blocked (explaining the lack of
dual neural activity for irregulars); if not, the regular rule fires in a separate mechanism
(the process shown by the second recorded pattern of neural activity). These data lend
support to Pinker’s claim that “rules” (for regular suffixation) and “words” (for irregular
formation) are subserved by separate mechanisms implemented in different specialization
regions o f the brain
In effect, we would be forfeiting the single mechanism hypothesis, adopting a
modularized system (i.e. multi-layered), but we would not necessarily be forfeiting the
claim to domain-generality. The reason why it is exceedingly difficult for neuroscientists
to pinpoint domain-specific neural language mechanisms is due to a larger issue of
plasticity. Because the brain is plastic, individuals suffering brain damage to one region o f
cortex can lose a specific ability, yet after some time, recover the function utilizing neural
mechanisms in an entirely different cortical r e g i o n A f t e r hemispherectomy, for example,
split-brain patients can potentially recover language abilities in their right hemisphere
(Gazzaniga, 1983), even though for most people so-called “language sites” are located in
the left hemisphere. Neurological studies have also revealed that left hemisphere regions
traditionally thought to control language processing also subserve other /?o/?-linguistic
tasks, like the planning of motor sequences (see Kimura, 1976) and “analytic” processing
(see Bradshaw & Nettleton, 1981).
Merzenich et al. (1983) mapped cortical sites to specific hand movements and

*^This is potentially an example of both multiple realizability’ (MR) and context dependence (CD). One
unitary higher-level function can be implemented in widely multifarious neurological sites and states (MR).
Moreover, neural sites and states may take on additional functions previously un-mappable to them (CD).
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sensations in owl monkeys, after damage to these sites, previously “silent” clusters of
neurons assumed the responsibility of controlling the monkey’s hand. In a series of
experiments, O’Leary et al. (1989, 1993) transplanted fetal plugs of cortical tissue from
one specialization region into an altogether different region, and surprisingly, the
transplanted neural tissue assumed the appropriate neurophysiological configuration for
each novel context. As Sejnowski puts it, “the relatively uniform structure of cerebral
cortex suggests that it is capable o f applying a general-purpose style o f computation to
many processing domains...” (1986: 372)'^. The logic o f the brain is not as restrictive as
the logic o f linguists, who, for ease of study, divide linguistic functions cleanly into distinct
domains (Deacon makes a similar argument, 1997). Even if cortical regions specialize in
one domain of processing, we cannot make the additional claim that these regions are
domain-specific (i.e. innately constrained to mediate one and only one class of stimuli).
At this point in our science, we are not even certain to what extent localization is a
function o f genes or environment (Caplan, 1987: 456), let alone domain-specificity.
Nevertheless, Pinker indicates that domain-specificity and serial symbol
architecture are characteristic of the brain, not just the mind (Pinker, 1994; Pinker, 1999:
241-68).
So our ability to tie the steps of language processing to circuits in the brain is still
rudimentary. For now we must settle for something simpler: clues that regular
and irregular words depend on different sets of brain systems. ..and clues that
irregulars depend more on the system for word memory and regulars more on the

an even finer grain of detail, neurons themseh'es are able to convey a variety of different contents
(multifunctionality). Hebb (1949) pioneered this idea, but refer also to Edelman (1989; 50), a single group
[of neurons] can participate in more than one kind o f signaling function.”
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system for rules. (1999; 243)
How are we to interpret such a “system for rules?” If there is a system in the brain whose
operations depend on explicit unconscious rules (as argued 1999: 1-239 for cognition), we
have evidence that Pinker’s higher-level theory o f regular formation is an implemented
theory (or at least it presents itself as one). But if his higher level theory of cognition is an
implemented theory, then “innate KOL,” “domain-specificity,” “explicit unconscious
rules,” and “serial symbol processing” can all be taken as descriptions o f the brain. At the
neural level, however, these descriptions would be entirely inaccurate.
The neurological evidence suggests that rigid domain-specificity cannot be
imposed upon neural mechanisms subserving language. If, as Pinker projects (1994, Ch.
10), 98% of all language related disorders result from impairment of some site along the
sylvian fissure in the left hemisphere, clearly language is localized across most individuals;
we can even go so far as to say that perisylvian regions specialize in language-related
computations, that is, that these regions primarily subserve language but also (or
otherwise) serve other classes of stimuli. But it is quite another thing for language to be
domain-specific, implemented in neural mechanisms that can only serve linguistic stimuli,
and the evidence clearly does not stack in this direction. Inflectional abilities are impaired
in agrammatic aphasies with damage near Broca’s area, for example, yet the same patients
can exhibit impairment to systems involved in a number of won-linguistic tasks (Erhard,
Kato, Strick, & Ugurbil, 1996). SLI patients also suffer setbacks on a number of different
general cognitive tasks, not only on tasks specific to language (Johnson, 1994; Thai &
Katich, 1996; Townsend, Wulfeck, Nichols, & Koch, 1995). Thus, the neural mechanisms
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subserving language must at least partly be involved in various general cognitive functions
(assuming there is no undiagnosed damage elsewhere).
In the new theory, a particular sub-set of general cognitive mechanisms would be
recruited for symbolic-style computations (based on hundreds o f thousands of years of
computing highly regular patterns if we want to go this far, or simply based on
modularization effects that occur in one’s lifetime, see B&G, p. 64). Modularity effects of
this nature would satisfy the cognitive need for both rapid (highly constrained) and
attended (less constrained) processing (again, see Givon, 1999). This would be
“implementational connectionism” (see Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988),
invalidating the claim to “eliminative connectionism,” but it would nevertheless emphasize
the fact that PDPs are our best available models of how higher-level symbolic operations
are implemented at the lower level (i.e in local processes). On such a view, regular past
tense structures could rightly be said to emerge (as by-products o f domain-general
processes), though this particular process of emergence would be much more highly
constrained, as in Bates and Goodman’s bubble analogy.
The beauty of the “implemented symbolic processing” account of past tense lies in
the fact that a system of PDP modules of this nature mirrors the beauty of our biological
endowment itself. For the past five decades, nativists have been approaching the problem
incorrectly. Instead o f pigeon-holing each seemingly unlearnable behavior or trait into a
genetic substrate (e.g. genes that code for a “word=stem+affix” template, language genes,
etc.), we need to approach the problem much more interactively. Human genomes have
been forever evolving in cotijunction with structure already in the world, as a result, our
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genes specify only the minimal information required to ensure a given behavior. “The
modest number o f human genes means that we must look elsewhere for the mechanisms
that generate the complexities inherent in human development” (Venter et al.. Science, 16
Feb., 2001, p. 1346). The beauty of our boigenetic endowment is that it is subtle (i.e.
“modest”). Genetic determinism, the claim that the most formative constraint on
ontogenesis is the genome, in other words, that complex higher-level behaviors are
predetermined, or “hard-wired” in the genome, is an untenable claim in light of modem
findings in genetics (Venter et al., p. 1348).
Results o f the Human Genome Project speak more to the emergentist account of
indirect, conservative genetic interaction presented by Bates & Goodman and Elman
(1999)—a complex synergy of gene-gene, gene-environment, gene-organism, and
environment-organism interactions throughout ontogenesis. Entering the Human Genome
Project, researchers originally predicted that they would find about 100,000 different
genes, our complete biological endowment. Much to their surprise, they found about
30,000, significantly fewer than the number of genes that make up a grain of rice*’. Each
gene is dedicated to a multitude of functions (also refer to Greenspan, 1995), not just to a
single domain, and genes get re-used in multiple gene-gene interactions (frequently dubbed
“epistasis”). Nor do genes specify maximal structure (i.e. direct gene-behavior
correspondences) when the need to is non-existent, that is, where our biological
endowment of non-linguistic mechanisms and other complex interactions adequately

'’Refer to these addresses; www.nhgri.nih.gov (Human Genome Project site) and www.celera.com (Corporate
Genome Project site). Also refer to Science, Februaiy 16, 2001 and Nature, February 15, 2001. For a
layperson’s summary of related issues, refer to the AJissoulian, February 12, 2001, “Human genetic map
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handle the behavioral phenomena.
For language, we are getting increasingly closer to the view that maximal structure
(e.g. language genes, UG genes) and domain-specific architecture are unnecessary in
many domains of processing. As the list of general cognitive mechanisms used for
language expands (e.g. MacWhinney et al., 1999), the need for direct innate architecture
diminishes. Some innate architecture is required to overcome the induction problem, but
whether or not this is domain-specific architecture remains to be seen. To date, there is no
conclusive genetic or neurological evidence that the human genome codes for rigid
domain-specificity (or “modularity” in the standard Fodorian sense) when it comes to
“words” and “rules.” Specialization regions are the outcome, not the cause, of
ontogenesis. Linguistic research needs to be methodical in discovering whether our ever
expanding collocation of general cognitive mechanisms is sufficient to overcome the
induction problem in particular domains. Only then can we be sure what belongs in
grammar proper, or if there is anything there at all.
An alternative research program would be dedicated to the discovery of how
associative memory, and its sub-layers, need to be constrained in order to overcome the
induction problem, conceding that some innate constraints on general learning need to be
posited, though much more indirect ones (see Elman, 1999). The empirical task for the
future is to determine in which domains o f inquiry less constrained connectionist networks
are applicable (e.g. irregulars but not regulars in past tense morphology), as opposed those

smaller than expected,” by Robert S. Boyd.
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in which highly constrained PDPs are applicable (e.g. regulars but not irregulars). To
adequately account for the origins of linguistic structure, we cannot stop at the conclusion
that different domains seem to require different mechanisms. We must go further to
explain how these mechanisms are biologically implemented at the lower level, where
“linguistic intelligence” is implemented in domain-general architecture and local processes.
Nature is thrifty. If a linguistic function can be accomplished by domain-general
mechanisms, there is no need to waste precious resources in order to create a domainspecific one. A constraint free, open-ended memory runs flat into the induction problem,
but an associative mechanism constrained by its own innate architecture and schedule of
development—and by structure in the world—can clearly overcome this problem (especially
if we build further constraints and sub-modules into the model to handle rigid rule-bound
behavior in general).

9.0 A Comprehensive Approach to Language’s Emergence:
A t different levels o f analysis, both Bates/Goodman and Pinker provide accurate
descriptions o f the way children come to perform complex grammatical operations. To
provide an adequate and well-supported description of the rule-bound behavior underlying
English regular past tense formation at the psychological level, we must appeal to some
form of serial symbol processing, and abandon less constrained connectionist networks as
inaccurate models. At the implementational level, though, there is no need to abandon
connectionist descriptions. Rule-based learning has been successfully implemented in
connectionist networks for the past two decades (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986;
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Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland & Hinton, 1986; Touretsky, 1986; Elman, 1999).
Rule-based operations (i.e. grammar) might very well seem like they are implemented in a
serial symbol processor from a higher-level perspective, but at the neural (or “abstract
neurological”) level actually be implemented in a connectionist network. Rumelhart and
McClelland have made it clear that “their own program is one addressed to the
microstructures o f cognition, and this seems to allow for the possibility that more
traditional cognitive models might characterize the macrostructure” (Bechtel 265).
It becomes important, then, to develop some way of relating the more abstract,
cognitive-level theory to the underlying neurophysiology. More fundamentally,
this relation is central to conceptions of the relation between mind and brain. It is
therefore o f considerable importance to have an explicit theoretical framework for
conceptualizing the exact nature of this relation. (R&M, 1988: 329)
Evidently, then, much of the criticism Pinker levels at Rumelhart and McClelland is mis
directed, as both o f their accounts are necessary for a comprehensive description of past
tense learning, one that includes descriptions at the micro- (implementational,
neurological) and macro- (functional, psychological) levels. From a macro-level
perspective, we have evidence of innately constrained domain-specific machinery at work,
and built-in KOL undergirding acquisition. From a micro-level perspective, on the other
hand, all we have are “dumb” statistical and mechanical procedures at work, and nonlinguistic machinery used in linguistic (and perhaps other) domains.
Symbol processing is implemented in connectionist architecture, not the other way
around, as Pinker & Prince argue (1988). If it were the other way around, our account
would provide no adequate explanation as to how symbol processing is implemented at
the lower level; but such an explanation is imperative (otherwise our higher-level theory
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might correspond to nothing physical in the world). This is clearly not a reductionist
account o f the phenomena (though token physicalist). The integrity of each level of
description needs to be preserved in a more comprehensive account. In the case o f past
tense formation, a certain quality of description is lost when we descend to the descriptive
vocabulary of the lower level, from “knowledge of lexical root,” “knowledge of head,”
“knowledge o f lexical entry” to rudimentary cellular mechanics. We could not, in theory,
build our psychological description solely from a neurological account of the phenomena.
At some level of analysis, the seams of these two theories do not neatly overlap (at least
isomorphically, or type physically; for fiirther discussion on the larger issue of nonreducibility o f psychology to neurology, see Fodor, 1974). By resisting the temptation to
eliminate the higher-level description with one from the lower level, we have both theories
with which to build a unified, comprehensive account. Thus, we should be careful not to
collapse the two levels into one, as they are each necessary (though insufficient) in our
comprehensive view. Although from a lower-level perspective, higher-level phenomena
(e.g. rule application) may be mere by-products of lower-level processes, the lower level
per se gives us an impoverished account.
If descriptions solely at the lower level run the risk of mis-characterizing higherlevel grammatical operations, then likewise descriptions solely at the higher level might
miss the possibility that rigid rule-bound behavior can, in fact, be implemented in highly
constrained connectionist networks. Neural nets whose weights are pre-set, whose
learning rule is strong enough, etc., exhibit highly constrained, rule-like, but nevertheless
emergent behavior (in the sense that grammar is mediated by a mechanism that might
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otherwise subserve non-linguistic classes of stimuli, or by one that might subserve both
classes o f stimuli). Pinker does not entertain this possibility because he draws his
conclusions from observation of mostly higher level phenomena (e.g. the “wug test,” and
other such psychological tests).
Insofar as the “emergence o f grammar from the lexicon” is concerned, when we
look at specific grammatical operations at the m ural level, this might simply mean is that
grammar is mediated by a similar processor (similar to the one that mediates the lexicon),
though one much more rigidly constrained. But clearly this is neither the strength nor
variety o f “emergence” that Bates and Goodman have in mind; for they want to say
grammar is mediated by the same processor as the lexicon (i.e. the same set of nodes and
connections). In this regard, the dual-mechanism account is essentially correct that there
are separate mechanisms for words and rules, it is not necessarily correct, however, that at
the neural level, one mechanism is a serial symbol processor, and the other a PDP. At the
neural level, a serial symbol processor dedicated to language and only language is highly
unlikely'*. A PDP type processor is far more reasonable because it follows principles of
general cognition,

plausible neurophysiological mechanisms to work (i.e. more

flexible categorization of stimuli and domain-general architecture). It is unclear what
biological mechanisms (or “hardware”) would even be available for a lower-level
explanation of past tense in classical serial symbol processing terms, especially in light of

**For a detailed summary of why serial symbol processors are unlikely at the iiiiplementatioiiai level, refer to
Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988: 335-7. Three o f the reasons included therewith are the “ 100 step constraint”
(=>SSPs too slow for brain-style computation), acute sensativity to damage and noise (=>SSPs suffer
catastrophic damage, whereas brains usually undergo reorganization), and lastly, rigidity (=>rules governing
SSPs lack adequate flexibility).
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the domain-specificity claim. Thus, Pinker’s description of past tense formation at the
psychological level is fairly exact-for both regulars and irregulars; at the neural level, by
contrast, he offers a fairly exact description of irregular formation, but only an
approximate description o f regular formation.
At the neural level, the general type of mechanism that Bates and Goodman
propose for grammar is perfectly permissible (but note that this is not such a radical claim
now). At the psychological level, however, appealing to less constrained versions of this
same mechanism leads to inadequate descriptions of particular grammatical phenomena.
The question of which grammatical operations prove to be more rigidly constrained (and
h o w \ as opposed to those which prove to be motivated by less constrained associative
devices, is essentially an open-ended empirical matter, a puzzle for linguistics of the 21st
century.
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Figure 1:

Chomsky & Halle (1968)
Granmar
(sy sto n a tic )
Lexicon
(non-sys)

Figure 2:

Pinker(1999)
Granmar
(system atic)

Lexicon
(sem i-sys

Figure 3:

Bates & Goodman (1999)

Input
—
(structured)
Grammar
(sys)
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Figure 4:
(from Pinker, 1999: 130)

look up

word
ad d -ed

Figure 5:
Output

Î

Input
( increm ental)
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Figure 6;

(from Pinker, 1999; 23) 19

M outh and Ears

Phonolow
(rules that define
the sound pattern
of a language)

/
Lexicon
(stored entries
for words,
including irregulars)

—

\

\
Morphology
(rules ror forming
complex words,
including regulars)

Syntax
(rules for
forming phrases
and sentences)

1 /
Sem antics
(meanings expressed
through language)

Beliefs and Desires

19

The only difference between Pinker’s sketch of the linguistic system and Chomsk}' & Halle’s ( 1968) is the
inclusion o f irregular past tense forms in the lexicon. Chomsky & Haile would only include minimal structure
in the lexicon for irregulars, so only the root form plus an appropriate change “tag” would be stored.
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Figure 7:
Which Mechanism Accomplishes What—
IRREGULARS

REGULARS

GENERALIZATION

C/H(1968):

G

G

G

R/M (1988):

L

L

L

P/M (1993):

L

L/?*

IV?*

D/S (1994):

L

L

L

P (1999):

L

G

L

♦The “?” symbol means there is some discrepancy. P/M “patch in” regular suffixes to the output
units, so the same weights that compute irregulars do not necessarily generate regular past tenses:
this can happen in the absence of a found irregular “closest match.” Also, generalization of the
“-ed” suffix to novel stems may fall out of the same process—the absence of a “closest match.”
Facts to be accountedfor—
(adequate accounts get a “$” symbol, otherwise “X”)
REG. ERRORS (selective)

IRR. ERRORS (s.)

REG BUT INCONS.

C/H:

X

X

X

R/M:

X

X

X

P/M:

X

$

$

D/S:

X

$

$

P:

$

$

X

C/H and R/M can only account for macro u*shaped learning, but not micro. P/M & D/S
cannot account for regularization errors because candidate verbs may have little phonological
similarity to patterns in memory; but this is really the only basis for generalizing the “-ed” suffix,
unless we rely on the regular pattern being the most robust pattern in memory (which it is not crossculturally). Pinker can deal with this problem because he distinguishes between regularity based on
frequency and psychological regularitj', the later of which acts as the default rule. Nevertheless,
Pinker cannot account for the regular but inconsistent class (see "A Convergent Model” section).
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(from R&M, 1986; 263-4)
Table 1:

THE MODEL S RESPONSES TO UNFAMILIA R
LOW-FREQUENCY IRREGULAR VERBS
presented
Word

Phonetic
Input

Phonetic
Response

English
Rendition

Response
Strength

bid
thrust

/bid/

hr'

St/

/b i d /
/T r's fd /

(bid)
(ihrusted)

0.55
0.57

11

bend
lend

/ben d /
/lend/

/b e n d 'd /
/le n d 'd /

(bended)
((ended)

0.28
0.70

(II

creep
weep

/krEp/
/wEp/

/krEpt/
/w Epi/
/w e p t/

(creeped)
(weeped)
(wept)

0 51
0.J4
0.33

IV

catch

/k ac/

/k act/

(catched)

0.67

V

breed
grind
wind

/brE d/
/g rin d /
/w in d /

/ b r E d 'd /
/g rin d /
/w in d /

(breeded)
(grind)
(wind)

0.48
0.44
0.37

VI

cling

/kliN,'

dig
Slick

/d ig /
/ s iik /

/ k l iv d /
/k l'N /
/d ig d /
/s tik t/

(dinged)
(clung)
(digged)
(sucked)

0.28
()23
0.22
0.53

tear

/ter/

/terd/

beared)

0.90

Verb
Type
1

VII
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Table 2:

SYSTEM RESPONSES TO UNFA M ILIA R LOW-FREQUENCY R EGULAR VERBS

Verb
Type
End in

Presented
Word

Phonetic
Input

Phonetic
Response

Engli.sh
Rendition

Response
Rendition

/gurrd/

/gurd/
/giitrd'd/

1guard)
(guarded)

Q.29
0.26

kid

/kid/

/kid/
/k id 'd /

(kid)
(kidded)

0.39
0.24

mate

/m A t /

/m A t'd /
/roA d'd/

(mated)
(maded)

043
0.23

guard

lid

End in
unvoiced
consonant

End in
voiced
consonant
or vowel

squat

/s k w 't/

/s k w * t 'd /
/s k w 't/
/ s k w ’kt/

(squated)
(squat)
(squawked)

0.27
0.22
0.21

carp

/k u trp /

/k u rp t/
/k a r p i'd /

(carped)
(carpted)

0.21

(L28

drip

/d r i p /

/ d r i p t 'd /
/ d r ip i/

(dripted)
(dripped)

028
0.22

map

/m ap/

/m a p t'd /
/m ap t/

(mapted)
(mapped)

0.24
0.22

shape

/ sap/

/SAPt/
/sip t/ •

(shaped)
(shipped)

0.43
0.27

sip

/sip/

/sipt/
/ s e p t/

(sipped)
(sapped)

0.42
0.28

slip

/s lip /

/slept/

(slept)

0.40

smoke

/sm O k /

/s m O k i'd /
/s m O k /

(smokted)
(smoke)

0.29
0.22

snap

/sn ap /

/sn a p t'd /

(snaptedl

0.40

step

/step /

/ s t e p t 'd /

(stepted)

0.59

type

/u p /

/tip t'd /

(typted)

0.33

/brw n/

/b r w n d /
/b r 'n d /

(browned)
(brawned)

0.46
0.39

hug

/h'g/

/h'g/

(hug)

0.59

mail

/ m A 'I/

ZmA'Id/
/m e m b 'ld /

(mailed)
(membled)

033
0,23

tour

/tur/

/tc fd 'r/
/turd/

(toureder)
(toured)

0,31
0.25

brown
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English Irregular & Regular Past Tense
(from Bybee & Slobin, 1982)

Irregular:
I. No Change: beat, hit, cut
n Stem-final /d/~>/t/: send/sent, build/built
n i . Internal Vowel Change (JVC) + stem-final /d / or/t/: feel/felt, lose/lost, say/said,
tell/told
rV. JVC, delete stem-fmal consonant (C), + stem-final /d / or /t/: bring/brought,
catch/caught
V. JVC where stem-final C [+dental]: bite/bit, find/found, ride/rode
Via. VC /i/—>/a/: sing/sang, drink/drank
VIb. JVC /// or /a / —> C/: sting/stung, hang/hung
VII. A ll other IVCs: give/gave, break/broke

Vni. VC where stem-final diphthong: blow/blew, fly/flew
Regular:
I. A dd/-Id/w here stem-final C [^dental]: start/started

n. A dd/-t/w here stem-final C [-voice]: look/looked
ITT A dd/-d/w here stem-final V, or C [+voice]: move/moved
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